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METHODOLOGY AND CRITERIA IN DUE PROCESS
ADJUDICATION-A SURVEY AND CRITICISM
SANFORD H. KADISHi
THE apparently chaotic array of Supreme Court decisions on the due process
requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments presents an imposing
challenge to anyone who would formulate a unifying rationale. It is difficult,
for example, to imagine what general, systematic principle of law could be
deduced from the following conclusions: a criminal conviction based on a
confession obtained by physical and mental coercion violates due process re-
gardless of its testimonial reliability," but a conviction based on incriminating
evidence obtained by acts concededly violative of the due process clause is not
itself violative of due process;2 the privilege against self-incrimination 3 and
the right to be free of convictions based upon unconstitutional searches and
seizures 4 are not protected by due process of law, but a conviction for illegally
possessing narcotics based on the evidential use of narcotics unwillingly pumped
out of the accused's stomach does violate due process ;5 the use of illegally ob-
tained evidence to procure a conviction is not violative of due process when
the illegality consists of breaking into the accused's office and rifling through
his papers,0 but does violate due process (at least in the eyes of two members
of the Court) when the illegality consists of repeated and unauthorized entries
for the purpose of installing a microphone and stringing wires to a neighbor-
ing garage ;7 due process is violated by the denial of an opportunity for the
accused to retain counsel,s but not (necessarily) by the denial of an opportunity
to have counsel appointed where a private retainer is financially impossible.9
tProfessor of Law, College of Law, University of Utah; Fulbright Visiting Professor,
University of Melbourne, School of Law, 1956-57.
1. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596
(1948); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
2. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1948).
3. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908).
4. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1948).
5. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
6. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1948).
7. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 142 (1.954) (Frankfurter and Burton dissenting
opinion).
8. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
9. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948) ; Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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It may well be wisdom to recognize that the definition of procedural due proc-
cess is not susceptible of confinement within a formula. And the keynote struck
by the Supreme Court in 1877 that the meaning of due process must be de-
termined only by a "gradual process of inclusion or exclusion"'1 surely is in
the best pragmatic tradition. Yet, in the interest of assaying the possibilities
of rational and deliberative constitutional adjudication, the diverse array of
Supreme Court holdings fairly prompts the questions: By what principle is
it determined or determinable what procedures are or are not consistent with
due process? Is there a "rationalizing principle" that serves to give "proper
order and coherence" to these adjudications?"
Conceding that it is in the nature of this constitutional provision that all-
embracing definitions are impossible, it is nonetheless germane in a rational
inquiry to ask through what intellectual process determinations have been or
should be made. It may be that those critics are correct who deny the ex-
istence of any "right" decision and who view the basis of constitutional ad-
judication as no more than the personal predeliction, the subjective preference
of the justices who make the decisions; but the possibilities of human intelli-
gence should not be too quickly dismissed. Likewise in a tradition of aration-
ality are the critics of reason of another school who insist that "right" decisions
are reachable and often reached but only through the ineffable grouping of
the minds of good men directed by an extra-rational magnetism inherent
in the order of things. For to assert that right conclusions are capable of
being reached in concrete cases by subjective evaluation, but that objective
analytical generalizations of the specifications for determining right decisions
are impossible, is tantamount to denying the basic postulate of reason and
scientific method. In any event, whether doomed to failure at the outset or
not, the purpose of what follows is to undertake some preliminary explorations
into the possibilities of rational decision-making in the area of procedural due
process.
The first two sections of this Article are devoted to an examination of the
means that have been employed by the Supreme Court to give meaning to
procedural due process. The objective in these pages is to describe rather than
to evaluate. The first section purports to identify two basic themes that have
historically characterized attempts to give meaning to due process-fixity and
flexibility. The second section is concerned with further inquiry into what
has become the prevailing view-the concept of a flexible due process. Here
the objective is to classify and describe the means employed by the Court in
10. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877).
11. Cf. Cardozo, J., in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937):
"The line of division may seem to be wavering and broken if there is a hasty
catalogue of the cases on the one side and the other. Reflection and analysis will
induce a different view. There emerges the perception of a rationalizing principle
which gives to discrete instances a proper order and coherence .... [The inclusion
and exclusion] has not been arbitrary or casual. It has been dictated by a study and
appreciation of the meaning, the essential implications, of liberty itself."
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shaping an evolving and expanding due process. The premise is that by and
large the Court has not been content to rest upon a frankly avowed subjective
choice, but rather has attempted to rest choice upon criteria outside its per-
sonal idiosyncratic judgment.
The remaining pages of the Article are directed to a critical appraisal of
the problems described in the first two sections. The third section picks up
the controversy between a fixed versus a flexible due process described in the
first section. In the first part the thesis is presented that a fixed due process
is fundamentally unattainable. Attempts to achieve it have at best only dis-
guised the fact that the problem inherently entails a choice of values. In actu-
ality, they have only divorced the process of choice from the discipline of
intellectual candor and rational analysis. The second part of this section elabo-
rates the thesis that, apart from attainability, a fixed due process is undesirable
-only a flexible due process responsive to the demands of new contexts ex-
amined in light of reason and experience is compatible with the proper role
of the due process clause in the written constitution of a nation committed to
judicial review. The fourth section picks up the problem raised in the second
section-the development of standards to direct the process of signifying mean-
ings of a flexible due process. The first part of this section is devoted to an
analysis of the nature of the inquiry posited by the demands of a flexible due
process, apart from the limitations imposed by the character of institutions
responsible for making the final determinations. It is the premise of this
section that the predicament imposed by a flexible due process is not entirely
hopeless; the condition can be improved through the use of the methods of ration-
al inquiry, since the impasse created is usually the product of an inadequate
formulation of the relevant questions rather than the nature of the problem. The
second part of the fourth section concerns itself with the institutionalized tech-
niques of decision-making in this area (specifically, judicial review) that impose
limits upon the extent to which full rational inquiry can be undertaken practically.
FIXITY VERSUS FLEXIBILITY IN DUE PROCESS SIGNIFICATION-A
DESCRIPTION
The quest for fixity and the quest for flexibility have been the two dominant
motifs in the Supreme Court's search to give meaning to procedural due pro-
cess. So long as the ever-present danger of oversimplification in such categori-
zations is not forgotten it will be useful to examine the Court's thinking in
terms of these polar attributes.
Fixed Due Process
Of the relatively few cases prior to the Fourteenth Amendment that ex-
amined the problem 12-in terms of the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment directed against Congress-Den ex dent. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Im-
12. See Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1877).
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provement Co.13 is one of the earliest to have developed a due process of fixed
meaning. The issue involved the validity of treasury distress warrants pur-
suant to which property of a defaulting taxpayer was seized and sold by the
United States marshall without judicial proceedings. Finding in the Consti-
tution "no description of those processes which it was intended or allowed or
forbid" or even "what principles are to be applied to ascertain whether it be
due process," the Court formulated two principles for determining due process:
first, examine whether the process is in conflict with any of the provisions of
the Constitution itself; second,
"If not found to be so, we must look to those settled usages and modes
of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England, before
the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been
unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by
them after the settlement of this country."1 4
The methods of legal historical research thus became the key tool in constitu-
tional interpretation; if the search in the facts of the particular case yielded
the conclusion that the processes in issue did "not differ in principle from
those employed in England from remote antiquity-and in many of the States,
so far as we know, without objection-for this purpose, at the time the Con-
stitution was formed,"' 5 it followed that the procedure was consistent with
due process.
In 1884 the Supreme Court in Hurtado z. California" limited Murray's
absolute commitment to the uses of history. In sustaining under Fourteenth
Amendment due process California's innovation of the criminal information,
the Court stated that Murray must mean only that a process sanctioned by
immemorial usage necessarily is due process; and not that a process not so
sanctioned necessarily is inconsistent with due process.' 7
"Immemorial usage" as a single determinative test 18 for defining due pro-
cess has over the years on various occasions commended itself to a majority of
the Court or to individual justices. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Hurtado,"'
inquired into the settled usages and modes of procedure prior to the adoption
of the Constitution-making the point that "no other inquiry is at all per-
tinent"2 0 -and found the absence of the historical use of the information in
capital offenses conclusive of its inconsistency with due process. In 1896 the
standard of "substantial accord with the law and usage in England before the
13. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
14. Id. at 277. The precursors of this doctrine are discussed in Morr, DuE PRoCFSs
OF LAW 241-42 (1926).
15. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 277.
16. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
17. Id. at 528-29.
18. For other uses of history see discussion in text at pp. 353-57 infra.
19. 110 U.S. at 538.
20. Id. at 543. See his dissenting opinion in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605, 613-
14 (1900), embodying the same reasoning as to a criminal jury of less than twelve.
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Declaration of Independence, and in this country since it became a nation"
was made to determine the validity of a procedure requiring a prosecutor to
furnish costs if the jury trying the case found that the prosecution was instituted
without probable cause and with malicious motives.21 In Ownbey v. Morgan 22
the Court, on the authority of the Murray principle, found historical English
practice conclusive of the validity of a procedure that required a nonresident
defendant whose property was attached to give security for the discharge of
the property seized as a condition of appearing and defending.23 A procedure
whereby the accused was tried before a mayor whose compensation derived
from the fine imposed was held inconsistent with due process in Tumey v.
Ohio,24 largely in view of its inconsistency with historical English practice.
A second exemplification of the fixity motif is found in those cases that
identified the requirements of due process with a fair trial, defined to mean
jurisdiction, notice and opportunity to be heard, in accordance with generally
established procedure for the trial of cases.25 One of the earlier statements
of this position is the classic phrasing of Mr. Webster in Dartmouth College v.
Woodward :26 "By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law;
a law, which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and
renders judgment only after trial. '2 7 The Court in Davidson v. New Orleans 28
in sustaining a real estate development assessment without judicial proceedings
stated a typical formulation of this view:
"[I]t is not possible to hold that a party has, without due process of law,
been deprived of his property, when, as regards the issues affecting it,
he has, by the laws of the State, a fair trial in a court of justice, according
to the modes of proceeding applicable to such a case."'2 9
21. Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81, 85 (1896).
22. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
23. "A procedure customarily employed, long before the Revolution, in the commer-
cial metropolis of England, and generally adopted by the states as suited to their circum-
stances and needs, cannot be deemed inconsistent With due process of law.... ." Id. at 1.11.
24. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
25. "Due process requires that the court which assumes to determine the rights of
parties shall have jurisdiction . . . and that there shall be notice and opportunity
for hearing given the parties . . . . Subject to these two fundamental conditions,
which seem to be universally prescribed in all systems of law established by civilized
countries, this court has up to this time sustained all state laws, statutory or judi-
cially declared, regulating procedure, evidence and methods of trial and held them
to be consistent with due process of law... !'
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110-11 (1908).
26. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) *518 (1819).
27. Id. at *581.
28. 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
29. Id. at 105. See also Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 340 (1915) ; Kennard v.
Louisiana ex rel. Morgan, 92 U.S. 480 (1876). This development is traced in MoT, DuE
PROCESS OF LAW § 88 (1926). See also Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth
Amendmwnt, 39 H.Av. L. REv. 431, 440 (1926).
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Another mode of deriving fixed meanings for due process has proceeded
through the structure of the Constitution itself. An early manifestation of this
approach involved the application of the principles of statutory construction.
Since the due process clause was a part of the Fifth Amendment which was
one part of the Bill of Rights, due process could not properly be construed to
include, exr vi termini, any of the specific guarantees contained in the other parts
of the Bill of Rights.30 And since Fourteenth Amendment due process cannot
reasonably be interpreted differently from Fifth Amendment due process, the
same conclusion follows for the processes imposed upon the states.31 Never
more than a makeweight, the argument was politely put to rest in Powell v.
Alabama, where the Court characterized it as an "aid to construction" which
"must yield to more compelling considerations whenever such considerations
exist."13 2 Its contemporary interest resides largely in the contradictory con-
clusion of a later approach that likewise purports to find fixed meanings in
the terms of the constitutional document-the conclusion that due process is
exactly coextensive with the explicit guarantees of the entire Bill of Rights.
The terminal point of this latter analysis is the history of the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Again suggesting the methods of statutory con-
struction, the argument proceeds by way of an historical demonstration that
it was the intent of the framers or the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment
(or of the public when it was being discussed) that the due process clause
should fasten upon the states all of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.33
While this thesis has repeatedly been rejected by majorities on the Court,3
it caught the imaginations of the legal commentators 35 and has had vigorous
exponents on the Court-chiefly Justice Harlan of the post-Civil War Court
30. "According to a recognized canon of interpretation, especially applicable to formal
and solemn instruments of constitutional law, we are forbidden to assume, without
clear reason to the contrary, that any part of this most important amendment is
superfluous."
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534 (1884).
31. Id. at 535-36.
32. 287 U.S. 45, 66-67 (1932). The Court noted its earlier implicit rejection in
Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (eminent domain-Fifth Amend-
ment) and Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (free speech-First Amendment).
It may be observed, however, that the argument has survived with a different orienta-
tion: i.e., as indicating that it was not the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in enacting the due process clause to make it embody each and every provision of
the Bill of Rights. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 412, 415 (1945) (concurring
opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
33. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
34. E.g., Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953) ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
35. See, e.g., Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional
Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1954) ; Fairman, Does the Four-
teenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN.
L. REv. 5 (1949) ; Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? The Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REv. 140 (1949).
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and Justice Black of the contemporary Court. It has been invoked as the basis
for precluding the states from imposing cruel or unusual punishment,36 from
employing a jury of less than twelve in criminal cases,3 7 from permitting
comment on the refusal of the defendant to testify,38 and from failing to ap-
point counsel for indigent criminal defendants. 39
Flexible Due Process
The principle of a flexible due process whose meaning is not wholly defined
by any fixed standard has had the most success with the Supreme Court. While
earlier statements of this principle are commonly cited,40 it had its significant
rise in the growth of the Supreme Court's appeal to a "higher law," to a set
of overarching principles of rightness neither articulated in any document nor
capable of being confined in words, but which the Court has a duty nonetheless
to discover.4 ' The constitutional requirement of "due process of law" became
the vessel for containing this philosophy as regards both the power of the state
to regulate and its power to experiment with procedural innovations. The
uses and history of this variety of natural law in these two areas of substantive
and procedural due process ran rather different courses. In the area of sub-
stantive economic regulation it was invoked chiefly to invalidate legislation;
in the area of procedure it more often served to sustain the legislative or
judicial judgment.42 Again, in economic substantive matters it has atrophied
since the New Deal into an historical relic; in procedural matters it has
achieved in the same period its most forceful articulation and application. But
it is nevertheless fairly clear that the theory, as a principle of constitutional
adjudication, is at the core the same in both areas.
Articulation of the moral principles that determine whether a given process
constitutes due process, has been inevitably general and subjective. Setting
the pattern, early post-Fourteenth Amendment decisions called approving at-
tention to an 1819 case interpreting Fifth Amendment due process as having
been "intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the pow-
ers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights
and distributive justice."'4 3 The classic and much quoted extract from Justice
Matthews' opinion in Hurtado v. California identified due process with "those
36. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 370 (1892) (dissenting opinion).
37. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 606-17 (1900) (dissenting opinion).
38. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion); Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908) (dissenting opinion).
39. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474 (1942) (dissenting opinion).
40. Most notably Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) *235, *244 (1819).
41. See HAINEs, TaE RmEvAL OF NArTURAL LAw CoNcEPTs cc. VI & VII (1930);
Grant, The Natural Law Backgrounid of Due Process, 31 CoLUm. L. REv. 56 (1931) ; Cor-
win, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARv. L. REv.
149 (1928).
42. See MorT, DUE PRoCESS OF LAW 254-55 (1926).
43. The quotation is from Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) *235, *244
(1819). It is adopted in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) as "the principal
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fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions ..... "4 Subsequently, in the famous opinion of
Justice Moody in Twining v. New Jersey, the crucial question was formulated
as whether or not a given procedure is "a fundamental principle of liberty
and justice which inheres in the very idea of free government, and is the in-
alienable right of a citizen of such a government."45
In recent times the most influential exponents of flexible-natural law due
process have been Justices Cardozo and Frankfurter. The former phrased
the determinative question in a variety of ways: whether the procedure in
issue was "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty"; whether to
employ it violated a "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental"; whether a "fair and
enlightened system of justice would be impossible without it"; whether "liberty
and justice" would exist if it were sacrificed; whether its use subjects a person
to "a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity would not endure it";
whether it is among those "immutable principles of justice, acknowledged
semper ubique et ab omnibus ... wherever the good life is a subject of con-
cern." 46 Justice Frankfurter carries this tradition forward in the contem-
porary Court. For him, due process includes those procedures required for
the "protection of ultimate decency in a civilized society." 47 Where the validity
of given procedures is in issue, what is dispositive is "whether they offend
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous
offenses," 48 for due process "embodies a system of rights based on moral
principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to
be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole his-
tory."
49
Justice Black, vanquished repeatedly in his heroic attempt to tie Fourteenth
Amendment due process to the explicit procedural guarantees of the Bill of
Rights, has articulated perhaps the most relevant question that can be asked
concerning the flexible-natural law due process: "what avenues of investigation
are open to discover 'canons' of conduct so universally favored that this Court
should write them into the Constitution ?"O Over seventy-five years of adjudi-
and true meaning of the phrase .. . [never] more tersely or accurately stated. .. ." See
also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908).
44. 110 U.S. 516,535 (1884).
45. 211.U.S.78,106 (1908).
46. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), and Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97 (1934).
47. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (concurring opinion).
48. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945).
49. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (concurring opinion). See also, e.g.,
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 142 (1953) (dissenting opinion); Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952) ; Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466 (1947)
(concurring opinion).
50. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 176 (1952) (concurring opinion).
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cation makes it possible to identify at least the most traveled boulevards. It
is to this purely descriptive task that the following section is devoted.
CRITERIA FOR INTERPRETING A FLEXIBLE DUE PROCESS-A DESCRIPTION
Few due process decisions are content to rest upon a naked, subjective
choice; by and large the opinions seek justification in stuff sturdier than the
personal feelings of the adjudicator. The authors of the great decisions in
the tradition of a flexible due process unfailingly exhibit a concern to insulate
personal predilections from the ultimate decision. Thus Justice Moody cau-
tioned that, "under the guise of interpreting the Constitution we must take
care that we do not import into the discussion our own personal views of what
would be wise, just and fitting rules of government to be adopted by a free
people and confound them with constitutional limitations." 51 Justice Cardozo
expressed a similar concern in Snyder v. Massachusetts.52 And on the con-
temporary Court Justice Frankfurter, the storm center of the natural law-due
process controversy, has repeated the admonition: "The . . . judgment in
applying the Due Process Clause must move within the limits of accepted
notions of justice and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely
personal judgment. '5 3
The effort to eliminate the purely personal preference from flexible due
process decision making has taken two main forms. One has been a respectful
deference to the judgment of the state court or the act of the legislature under
review5 4 The other has been an attempt to rest conclusions upon external and
objective evidence in such fashion that as far as possible it can be said that
the Court is not so much itself creating its own policy determinations as
it is interpreting and reading determinations that have already been made,
albeit inchoate and requiring articulation and reconstruction.
The Search for Established Moral Judgments
The most significant kind of such objective data has consisted of the moral
judgments already made on the point at issue, sought for in the express or
implicit views of important segments of our society, past or present. So, for
51. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106-07 (1908). Cf. Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516,527 (1884).
52. 291 U.S. 97,122 (1934).
53. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401) 417 (1945) (concurring opinion). See also
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 602-03
(1948) (concurring opinion).
54. See, e.g., Frankfurter, J., concurring in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417
(1945):
"The fact that judges among themselves may differ whether in a particular case -a
trial offends accepted notions of justice is not disproof that general rather than
idiosyncratic standards are applied. An important safeguard against such merely
individual judgment is an alert deference to the judgment of the state court under
review."
1957]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
example, it has been asserted by Justice Roberts, speaking for a majority of
the Court, that the answer to whether furnishing counsel in all cases is re-
quired by fundamental principles of fairness "may be found in the common
understanding of those who have lived under the Anglo-American system of
law." 55 Even Justice Black, the arch enemy of natural law, when obliged to
make battle on the enemies' grounds finds similar considerations determinative.
Thus dissenting in the same case he stated: "Denial to the poor of the request
for counsel in proceedings based on charges of serious crime has long been
regarded as shocking to the 'universal sense of justice' throughout this
country."56
Justice Frankfurter again has most explicitly stated this consideration which
recurs in most opinions in the natural law tradition. In his view, a determination
of standards of fairness and justice does not involve "the application of merely
personal standards but the impersonal standards of society which alone judges,
as the organs of Law, are empowered to enforce. 157 On some occasions he
finds that the standard dictated by the Constitution is the "consensus of society's
opinion."' 8 On other occasions he makes determinative the pervasive feelings
of our society however inarticulately expressedY9 He best expressed this view
when he rebelled against an ex parte determination by the state chief executive
of the sanity of a convicted murderer awaiting execution:
"Due process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what
is fair and right and just. The more fundamental the beliefs are the less
likely they are to be explicitly stated. But respect for them is of the very
essence of the Due Process Clause. In enforcing them this Court does
not translate personal views into constitutional limitations. In applying
such a large untechnical concept as 'due process,' the Court enforces those
permanent and pervasive feelings of our society as to which there is com-
pelling evidence of the kind relevant to judgments on social institutions."'0
To escape from the "idiosyncrasy of a personal judgment," the Court has
regarded its function as one of discovering and applying pre-formed moral
judgments, rather than of making new moral choices. But whose moral judg-
ments? And where and how are these judgments discoverable? The Court's
answers to these questions may be seen in four kinds of cases distinguished by
whether reliance was placed upon: (1) the opinions of the progenitors and
architects of American institutions; (2) the implicit opinions of the policy-
making organs of state governments; (3) the explicit opinions of other American
courts that have evaluated the fundamentality of a given mode of procedure; or,
(4) the opinions of other countries in the Anglo-Saxon tradition "not less
civilized than our own" as reflected in their statutes, decisions and practices.
55. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455,464 (1942).
56. Id. at 476.
57. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470 (1947) (concurring
opinion).
58. Id. at 471.
59. E.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 603 (1948).
60. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
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The Opinions of the Progenitors of American Institutions
One of the earliest and most cited of the natural law-due process decisions,
Twining v. New Jersey,"' attempted to find whether the privilege against self-
incrimination was among those "immutable principles of justice which inhere
in the very idea of free government, 06 2 in an historical study of "how the right
was rated during the time when the meaning of due process was in a formative
state, and before it was incorporated in American constitutional law."'0 3 The
Court found several indicia that in "the opinion of our constitution makers"
the privilege was not fundamental. First, "none of the great instruments in
which we are accustomed to look for the declaration of the fundamental
rights made reference to it."'' 4 Second, the privilege is omitted from
all the important documents of early colonial history. Third, of the thir-
teen states that ratified the Constitution, nine ratified either without proposing
any amendments or by proposing amendments that did not include the privilege
against self-incrimination; only four proposed amendments that included the
privilege, and of these, two did not adopt the privilege in their own constitu-
tions until considerably later.0 5
In Powell v. Alabama 00 the Court, considering whether due process en-
compassed the right to representation by counsel, was likewise concerned with
the understanding of the framers of the Constitution, this time with regard to
the restrictive English practice of denying the privilege of representation by
counsel in the more important criminal cases. The Court found of significance
that in at least twelve of the original thirteen colonies the restrictive rule of the
English common law was rejected and the right to counsel fully recognized
in all criminal prosecutions except in one or two instances where the right was
limited to capital offenses or the more serious crimes. In Betts v. Brady 67 the
Court ten years later faced the related question of whether due process required
the state to furnish counsel to the accused in all criminal cases. Constitutional
and statutory provisions in the colonies prior to the adoption of the Bill of
Rights evidenced to the Court that such a requirement was not in the "common
61. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
62. Id. at 102, quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898).
63. 211 U.S.at107.
64. Ibid.
65. "This survey does not tend to show that it was then in this country the universal
or even general belief that the privilege ranked among the fundamental and inalien-
able rights of mankind; and what is more important here, it affirmatively shows
that the privilege was not conceived to be inherent in due process of law, but on the
other hand a right separate, independent and outside of due process. . . . The in-
ference is irresistible that it has been the opinion of constitution makers that the
privilege, if fundamental in any sense, is not fundamental in due process of law, nor
an essential part of it. We believe that this opinion is proved to have been correct
by every historical test by which the meaning of the phrase can be tried."
Id. at 110.
66. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
67. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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understanding of those who have lived under the Anglo-American system of
law." 68 The Court found a great diversity in the constitutions of the thirteen
original states in respect to the right of counsel. Such provisions as there were
the Court attributed to an intent to reject the severe common law rule rather
than one to guarantee the presence of counsel in all cases. As for the institution
of appointing counsel for indigents, the Court found that this subject was
treated, if at all, by statutory regulations that varied greatly among the
colonies.
69
The Implicit Opinions of the Policy Making Organs of State Governments
The implicit judgments of the organs of the state governments on the
acceptability of a procedural mechanism as reflected in their constitutions,
statutes, judicial decisions and practices have been used primarily in two ways:
(1) to demonstrate the consistency of a given procedure with the requirements
of due process, and (2) as evidence of the fundamental character of a right
that may not be constitutionally violated.
Consistency with Due Process. In Betts v. Brady the Court sought the
"common understanding of those who have lived under the Anglo-American
system of law"'"0 not only in the opinions of the framers of the Federal Consti-
tution but also "in the constitutional, legislative, and judicial history of the
states to the present date."'71 From a study of the statutes and decisions of
the various states the Court found that appointment of counsel is predomi-
nantly viewed as a matter of legislative policy rather than as a fundamental
right essential to a fair trial; it therefore concluded that due process does not
obligate the states to furnish counsel in every case. It is of some interest that
a like survey led Justice Black to a contrary conclusion.
72
In Bute v. Illinois 73 a like issue was similarly disposed of; the Court rested
upon the practice of the state courts and of the federal courts before 1938 in
68. Id. at 464.
69. In Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (dissenting opinion), Justice
Frankfurter referred to the attitudes of such famous English law-men as Coke, Hawkins,
Hale and Blackstone, in maintaining that the execution of insane persons was inconsistent
with due process.
70. 316U.S. 455,464 (1942).
71. Id. at 465.
72. "In thirty-five states, there is some clear legal requirement or an established prac-
tice that indigent defendants in serious non-capital as well as capital criminal cases
.... be provided with counsel on request. In nine states, there are no clearly con-
trolling statutory or constitutional provisions and no decisive, reported cases on the
subject. In two states, there are dicta in judicial decisions indicating a probability
that the holding of the court below in this case would be followed under similar
circumstances. In only two states (including the one in which this case arose) has
the practice here upheld by this Court been affirmatively sustained. Appended to
this opinion is a list of the several states divided into these four categories."
316 U.S. at 477 n.2 (dissenting opinion).
73. 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
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reaching its conclusion that a proffer of counsel to an indigent accused was not
required by due process of law. The Court found that prior to its 1938 decision
in Johnson v. Zerbst,74 which interpreted the Sixth Amendment to require
appointment of counsel, federal practice did not show a consistent pattern of
appointment of counsel in noncapital cases.75 The Supreme Court discerned
no uniform practice of appointing counsel in state courts, although it did mark
a growing tendency in recent legislation to authorize the appointment of counsel
to defend the more serious charges. Even this tendency, however, had taken
place only since 1868 and was neither universal nor uniform. The Court ob-
served that in 1931, twenty states had no statute authorizing the appointment
of counsel in misdemeanor cases and fourteen had none even in felony cases
(excluding capital cases) .7
Evidence of Fundamental Rights. Using a commonly followed practice among
the states as evidence that a contrary practice violates due process has found
favor primarily in dissenting opinions.77 justice Roberts, dissenting from
Justice Cardozo's opinion in Synder v. Massachusetts,78 concluded that due
process precluded a defendant in a criminal case from being denied the right
to be present at the jury's view of the scene of the crime. He supported this
conclusion by demonstrating the universality of the privilege of the accused to
be present throughout the trial:
"In the light of the universal acceptance of this fundamental rule of
fairness that the prisoner may be present throughout his trial, it is not a
matter of assumption but a certainty that the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees the observance of the rule. '" 79
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Solesbee v. Bcdkconz s conducted an ex-
tensive examination of state legislation and judicial decisions. He found that
no state in the union would execute an insane man under sentence of death, and
that the states predominantly employ procedures affording a reasonable oppor-
tunity to the defendant to substantiate his claim of insanity before it is rejected.
He concluded that any procedure which deviated from this practice could not
meet due process safeguards.
74. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
75. 333 U.S. at 659-60.
76. Id. at 664.
77. However, in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948), holding a one-man grand
jury summary contempt conviction in camera a violation of due process, Justice Black, for
the majority, stated: "Counsel have not cited and we have been unable to find a single
instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal court
during the history of this country." And at 267-68: "Today almost without exception every
state by constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires that all criminal trials be open
to the public."
78. 291 U.S. 97,123 (1934).
79. Id. at 131. But see Cardozo, J., for the majority: "It is one thing to say that the
prevailing practice is to permit the accused to accompany the jury, if he expresses such a
wish. It is another thing to say that the practice may not be changed without a denial of
his privileges under the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 117.
80. 339U.S.9,14 (1.950).
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Dissenting in Brock v. North Carolina,"' Chief Justice Vinson argued that
a second trial, after the prosecution's request for a mistrial was granted to allow
it to obtain admissible evidence, was inconsistent with due process. He rested
upon the finding that no state except North Carolina permitted this practice,
that even North Carolina in its earlier cases had held to the contrary, and
that six states had taken strong positions against this practice.
The Explicit Opinions of Other American Courts
The express opinions of other courts, predominantly state courts, of the
fundamentality of given procedural rights has likewise been used to give con-
tent to flexible due process determinations. In Powell v. Alabama the Court
examined the state decisions on the right to counsel and found that they
"invariably recognize the right to the aid of counsel as fundamental in char-
acter."'8 2 In Snyder v. Massachusetts 83 both the majority and dissenting
opinions made a similar "search of the books" for state courts opinions on
the presence of a defendant at a jury view. The majority concluded that state
courts differed as to whether a defendant must be present at a view and that
no court had ever held the privilege "an essential condition of due process
under the Federal Constitution. '8 4 The dissent reached a contrary conclusion,
at least on the right of the accused to be present throughout the trial-a
conclusion which for the dissent was dispositive of the case.8 5
In Wolf v. Colorado 8 6 the Court considered whether due process required
the exclusion of evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure which itself
concededly violated the due process clause. Justice Frankfurter, for the ma-
jority, found the position taken by state courts on the admissibility of such
evidence "particularly impressive.' 8 7 The Court examined the state decisions
before and after the assertion of the federal exclusionary rule in Weeks v.
United States.88 It found that of the 27 state courts that had passed on the
issue before Weeks, 26 were contrary to and one was in accord with the
Weeks doctrine; since Weeks, 47 state courts had passed on the issue, 30 hold-
ing contrary to Weeks and 17 in accord. The Court concluded that the per-
vasive feeling of society, at least as reflected in these opinions, was that the ex-
clusion of this evidence was not compelled and that its admission in a criminal
trial was not violative of due process.8 9 Justice Murphy in dissenting apparently
81. 344U.S. 424,429 (1953).
82. 287 U.S. 45,70 (1932).
83. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
84. Id. at 118-19.
85. Id. at 131-32. See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
86. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
87. Id. at 29.
88. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
89. The methodology of this decision could equally well be considered a resort to the
implicit opinion suggested by general state judicial practice. The boundaries between im-
plicit opinion reflected in practice and explicit opinion of courts will necessarily overlap
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rejected the relevance of such an inquiry, stating that, "I cannot believe that we
should decide due process questions by simply taking a poll of the rules in
various jurisdictions ... "90
The Opinion's of Other Countries in the Anglo-Saxon Tradition
Justice Frankfurter has been the foremost exponent of reviewing the opinions
of other countries to determine the fundamentality of a procedural right, con-
fining his inquiry largely to the English speaking countries. 91 Wolf v. Colo-
rado 02 was the first case in which Commonwealth practice was investigated
exhaustively in a due process inquiry. The Court found that of ten jurisdictions
within the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth that had passed
on the question none excluded evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure.
"When we find that in fact most of the English speaking world does not regard
as vital to such protection [of the right of privacy] the exclusion of evidence
thus obtained, we must hesitate to treat this remedy as an essential ingredient
of the right.' '0 3 On the other hand, Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting
opinion in Stein v. New York 04 employed Commonwealth opinion to conclude
that due process was violated by the use in a trial of a confession elicited by
police pressure.0 5
Additional Methods of Giving Objective Content to a
Flexible Due Process
In addition to those inquires that turn on previously made moral judgments,
two other kinds of inquires may be briefly noted. One is exemplified in such
cases as Powell v. Alabama and Snyder v. Massachusetts, where a moral postu-
late of unquestioned acceptance is readily identifiable and the resolution of
the due process issue is made by a kind of logical deduction from the accepted
principle. Thus, in Powell v. Alabama the right to be represented by counsel
was deduced from the right to a hearing. The Court, finding that notice and
whenever there is a course of adjudication on the validity of a particular practice. See
also Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 432 (1953) (dissenting opinion) : "Thus, the
considered views of many other jurisdictions may be utilized in determining the basic re-
quirements of orderly justice and hence due process."
90. 338 U.S. at 46.
91. But cf. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 29-32 (1955) (dissent-
ing opinion), where Justice Frankfurter acquiesced in a majority holding that Congress
lacked power to subject civilian ex-servicemen to military jurisdiction for crimes com-
mitted during military service, in face of evidence that other nations with legal back-
grounds similar to ours permit the exercise of such jurisdiction; e.g., England, Australia,
Canada, New Zealand. Brief for the Respondent, ply. 29-31, 'United States ex reL. Toth
v. Quarles, supra.
92. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
93. Id. at 29.
94. 346 U.S. 156,199 (1953).
95. Id. at 200. See also Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 n.17 (1951).
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hearing together with proper jurisdiction are "basic elements of requirements
of due process," concluded that "the right to be heard would be, in many cases,
of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel." 90
And in Snyder v. Massachusetts, while both majority and dissent agreed on
the major premise-that due process included the right to be present through-
out the trial-they disagreed on whether the right to be present at the jury
view was a logical corollary of that basic right.
A second approach finds evidence of the inconsistency of a given procedure
with due process in the historical association of similar procedures with
tyrannical governments. So, for example, Justice Black, dissenting from a
holding that an excluded alien held on Ellis Island is not entitled to a hearing,
stated:
"No society is free where government makes one person's liberty depend
upon the arbitrary will of another. Dictatorships have done this since time
immemorial. They do now. Russian laws of 1934 authorized the People's
Commissariat to imprision, banish and exile Russian citizens as well as
'foreign subjects who are socially dangerous.' Hitler's secret police were
given like powers. German courts were forbidden to make any inquiry
whatever as to the information on which the police acted. Our Bill of
Rights was written to prevent such oppressive practices."9 7
FIxITY VERsus FLExIBILITY ix DuE PRocEss SIGNIFICATION-
AN EVALUATION
With the purely descriptive passages of the first two sections as a background,
it is now possible to examine critically the possibilities of reason and pragmatic
inquiry in due process signification. At the outset of such a venture some kind
of resolution of the controversy between a fixed and flexible due process is
required. The motifs of fixity and flexibility in the search to give meaning to
procedural due process reflect another and overriding controversy concerning
the nature and proper function of judicial review. Given, for better or for
worse, the institution of judicial review, is it essential to the democratic function-
ing of our institutions that Supreme Court policy-making be restrained by
objective standards of adjudication ?9 Is it at all possible to erect such objective
standards which can fairly be expected to direct the course of adjudication
reliably? 99 Or must the Court, to interpret those general constitutional pro-
visions that identify policies rather than precise rules, be allowed the broadest
range of policy determinations, albeit with deference to the legislative judg-
96. 287 U.S. at 68-69.
97. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 217-18 (1953). See also
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-70 (1948); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155
(1944).
98. Compare Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65
HAv. L. REv. 1 (1951), with Rostow, Tie Denocratic Character of Judicial Review,
66 H v. L. Rxv. 193 (1952).
99. See Hamilton & Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme Court, 50
YALE L.J. 1319 (1.941).
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ment ?100 If such judgments must be made, can they be made on any basis more
rational and demonstrable than the personal predilection of the majority of the
Justices sitting at a particular time? Fundamentally no attempt to evaluate the
merits of fixity versus flexibility in the interpretation of due process can fail
to take a position on this larger controversy. Yet it may prove more fruitful
to examine these issues in the narrower and more specific context of their rele-
vance in giving meaning to procedural due process, and even more specifically
in the context of that continuing debate between the two most extreme and
most articulate contenders for the fixed and the flexible on the present Court
(and perhaps on any Court), Justices Black and Frankfurter respectively.
These issues will be examined in this narrow context in terms of two criteria:
(1) the attainability and (2) the desirability of a fixed due process.
Attainability of a Fixed Due Process
It is possible, of course, to come to grips with Justice Black's thesis on the
level on which it is stated, through an examination of the evidence bearing on
the intended meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. This raises questions of
historical fact more or less amenable to the methods of historical research. 01
More pertinent for present purposes, however, is the philosophy of constitutional
adjudication that motivated his resort to historical intent to define the meaning
of procedural due process. Whatever the final judgment on the validity of
his historical argument, it is at least clear that the evidence is neither so com-
pelling nor unambiguous to have impelled him to this approach. Especially
in the case of Justice Black, whose heart is not often absent from the significant
elements impelling his conclusions, can one justly defend a modest skepticism
that he is being carried willy nilly by an irresistible tide of historical argument.
Nor has he attempted to conceal the main-springs of his position in this area.
His reasons are plainly revealed on the pages of his opinions. He has observed
the development of what he derisively terms the "natural law" theory of ju-
dicial review as a means whereby nine life-tenured judges have arbitrarily
superimposed their social and economic philosophy upon that of responsible
organs of government. And the technique of natural law in the area of pro-
cedural due process is the blood brother of natural law in the area of substantive
due process.
While the abuse of that uncontrolled power which the natural law doctrine
gives to the Supreme Court has been corrected in matters of laws regulating the
social and economic working of our society, the danger of untimely resur-
rection exists as long as the doctrine receives judicial acceptance. The natural
law formula "has been used in the past and can be used in the future, to license
this Court, in considering regulatory legislation, to roam at large in the broad
expanses of policy and morals and to trespass, all too freely, on the legis-
100. See HAND, SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 155-63 (1952); Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes
and the Constitution, 41 HAxv. L. REv. 121, 123-25 (1927).
101. See the studies cited note 35 supra.
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lative domain of the States as well as the Federal Government.' '10 2  But
another and more pressing fear "of even graver concern .. . is the use of
the philosophy to nullify the Bill of Rights.' 0 3 In past adjudications
of the Court he has seen compelling evidence that "the accordion-like
qualities of this philosophy must inevitably imperil all the individual liberty
safeguards specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights."'01 4 He has seen it
invoked to uphold state convictions that would have been reversible had the
express provisions of the Bill of Rights been found applicable-convictions in
which defendant was not provided with counsel,10° the privilege against self-
incrimination was abandoned, 0 6 the accused was put in double jeopardy, 10 7
and unconstitutional searches and seizures were condoned.'05 And his distrust
of the Court in matters of individual liberty is further strengthened by recent
decisions "sanctioning abridgment of the freedom of speech and press."'u0
Finally, and by way of generalization from these experiences, the untram-
meled and inscrutable power that the natural law theory of judicial review
delegates to a majority of the Justices of the Court is inconsistent with "the
great design of a written Constitution,""n0 which authorizes no judicial re-
straint on the legislative power beyond the written words of its specific pro-
visions. Hence the " 'natural law' formula . . . should be abandoned as an
incongruous excrescence on our Constitution.""'. Justice Black, therefore,
is led by his reasoning to the cause of a fixed due process whose meaning is
unfailingly indicated by objectively verifiable data and whose contours are
permanently fixed-in this case by the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment to embody the provisions of the Bill of Rights-beyond the
power of the Supreme Court to alter.
One can not fail to detect the apparent irony in Justice Black's final position.
A vigorous opponent of the doctrine of substantive due process as a vehicle
for uncontrolled judicial policy-making in the area of economic regulatory
102. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 90 (1947) (dissenting opinion). See
Comment, The Adamson Case, 58 YALE L.J. 268, 275 (1949):
"Pervading the pages of his dissent is Justice Black's distrust of the vagueness and
uncertainty of the due process formula. He is haunted by the specter of due process
as a clog on state economic legislation. His concern is to prevent a return to that
charismatic jurisprudence which enabled the Court to substitute its views on eco-
nomic policy for those of the legislature."
103. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 177 (1952) (concurring opinion).
104. Ibid.
105. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948) ; Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
106. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908).
107. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
108. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
109. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174, 177 (1952) (concurring opinion). The
reference is to Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) ; Feiner v. New York, 340
U.S. 315 (1951) ; American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
110. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 89 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
111. Id. at 75.
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legislation,"1 2 he has been among those on the Court who have sought to re-
serve a plenary power of judicial review in the area of civil rights. In this area
he has attempted to justify a judicial activism unrestrained by the doctrines of
deference to the legislative judgment and the presumption of constitutionality." 13
In his view the judicial veto over the legislature, while grossly undesirable in
matters of economic regulatory legislation, is required in the area of individual
liberties. Yet in applying Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process to
issues of individual freedom, Justice Black manifests a grave concern over a
doctrine of judicial review that endorses judicial policy reevaluations."14
On reflection, however, the inconsistency is less real than apparent. In
seeking to tie due process interpretation to the specific written provisions of
the Bill of Rights, Justice Black's theory of judicial review is an appealing one:
it precludes unfettered judicial subjectivity by pinning down constitutional
adjudication to the interpretation of specific written language, and at the same
time appears to give greater assurance that procedural guarantees will be
applied with the vigor he thinks appropriate. 115 But the notion that this latter
consequence follows from express directions in the written language of the
Bill of Rights is hardly supported by the nature of those provisions or by the
112. See, e.g., Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525, 533-37 (1949).
113. See, e.g., Black, J., for the majority in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509
(1946) : "When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those
of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful
of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position."
114. An obverse irony is no less apparent in Justice Frankfurter's position. In matters
of civil liberty, no less than in matters of economic regulation, he has been adamant in
defense of a consistent deference and passivism in exercising the function of judicial re-
view. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (dis-
senting opinion) ; McWhinney, The Supreme Court and the Dilemma of Judicial Policy-
Making, 39 MINN. L. REV. 837, 843-51 (1955). In the area of procedural due process,
however, he seems to be asserting a doctrine that increases, rather than decreases, the
latitude of discretion open to the Court in adjudicating constitutional issues.
115. Justice Black's position in determining the negative implications of the commerce
clause upon the power of the states to regulate economic affairs bears a resemblance to
his technique of due process adjudication. He has opposed the Stone view of a balanced
accommodation of state and national interests on the ground that the Court had no busi-
ness acting the role of "super-legislature" mediating between federal and state interests
on an ad hoc basis. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 784, 788 (1945) (dissent-
ing opinion). He would sustain all state regulations affecting interstate commerce "except
for state acts designed to impose discriminatory burdens on interstate commerce because
it is interstate," leaving the ultimate determination to Congress. Gwin, White & Price v.
Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 442, 455 (1939) (dissenting opinion). The reason for the resort
to an absolute test is again the feared use of the commerce clause as a substitute for due
process in compelling a laissez-faire business system. "The judicially directed march of
the due process philosophy as an emancipator of business from regulation appeared arrested
a few years ago. That appearance was illusory. That philosophy continues its march."
Hood v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 545, 562 (1949) (dissenting opinion). See Mendelson,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Process of Judicial Review, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 295, 298-
300 (1954).
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history of their interpretation by the Supreme Court. It may be conceded
that some of the first eight amendments are of the specific statutory character
which admit of little play for judicial value judgment-for example, the guaran-
tee of a jury trial in all criminal cases and in all civil cases in which the amount
in controversy exceeds twenty dollars," 6 and the guarantee of the initiation of
criminal proceedings by indictment. 1 7 But these are not the provisions with
which Justice Black is particularly concerned. The changing contours of and
the vigorous divisions of the Court concerning the meaning of freedom of and
from religion, 118 double jeopardy,119 cruel and unusual punishments, 120 the
privilege against self-incrimination 121 and unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures, 2 2 belie the notion that the literal language of these provisions directs and
confines judicial inquiry along specific lines.'2 3
The consequence of requiring due process to be measured precisely by the
provisions of the Bill of Rights is not to eliminate broad judicial inquiry,
but rather to change its focus from due process to freedom of speech or freedom
from double jeopardy, and the rest, and to disguise its essential character. The
notion that the problems of freedom and authority can be resolved by logically
subsuming concrete cases beneath general principles (here the Bill of Rights)
which secure their authority independently of the social contexts in which they
are applied is a surprising reversion to a "postulate" theory of legal principles
-surprising in view of its rejection in most other phases of the law. General
116. U.S. CoisT. amends. VI & VII.
11.7. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
118. Compare Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), with West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) ; and McCollum v. Board
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), with Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
119. See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) ; Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S.
100 (1904) ; see Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1847).
120. Compare majority and dissenting opinions in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Res-
weber, 329 U.S. 459, 472 (1947).
121. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 174, 177 (1952) (majority and concurring opinions) ; Rogers v. United States, 340
U.S. 367 (1951) ; Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
122. See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) ; Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145 (1947) ; Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
123. "Could limitation to the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights pin the Amend-
ment down to a precise and certain meaning? Unfortunately, the judicial history of
the first eight amendments does not indicate that its guarantees are particularly
specific. Nuances of interpretation have emerged which do not derive from a literal
reading. The words of the First Amendment do not lead inevitably to the conclusion
that freedom of speech means freedom to carry on peaceful picketing, or that the
free exercise of religion means license to distribute leaflets and ring doorbells. Nor,
to cite a most recent example, does it necessarily follow that 'public rides to private
schools' are permissible while the use of released time for religious education in
public schools is interdicted by the separation of church and state. The greater the
sweep of the Court's protection of personal liberties, the greater has been the de-
parture from literal adherence to verbal formulae."
Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 268, 276 (1949).
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principles do not decide concrete cases in the area of constitutional due process
any more than in matters of property, tort or contract. To put the problem
in terms of an absolute principle is to invite the assertion of a conflicting
principle and to preclude the possibilities of rational inquiry into the empiric
grounds for decision. The upshot is that empirical considerations must enter
by the back door, and issues of due process become a congeries of irreconcilable
moot points. In the end not only does personal predilection remain, but it exists
in a less manageable posture than before the search for certainty began.
The shift from a due process broadly conceived to one tied to the Bill of
Rights may, in view of the present status of the Supreme Court's definition
of these provisions, constitute a net tactical gain for the rights of the individual. 124
But it is hardly a triumph of fixed meanings over flexible ones. Ultimately it
amounts to an attempt to fortify certain favored doctrines of the Court by
less pregnable barriers than those raised by any fluid concept of due process;
for if the Court's interpretations of the Bill of Rights have been properly
criticized, it is likely that the Court in the future will do worse rather than better
-judged by the value choices of Justice Black. In the end, then, while the
irony may linger, the apparently underlying inconsistency disappears-Justice
Black's heart is still visible scarcely below the surface of his opinions.
Other historical attempts to derive fixed meanings -as by ascertaining the
particular abuses that the framers of the Constitution had in mind to correct,
or by discovering those immemorial usages in England that were not rejected
by the Colonies-would appear to promise no greater assurance of success.
In view of the inherent ambiguity in the phrasing of such questions, especially
the former, 2 5 and the proven inadequacy of such quests to yield conclusive
answers,'12 the purely historical search can be expected to do little more than
124. But see id. at 285:
"Today a person who has been railroaded to prison has a good chance of obtaining
federal relief. Fifteen years ago he had virtually none. That is the great achieve-
ment of procedural due process in the Fourteenth Amendment. Starting almost from
scratch in 1932, the Court has built up an impressive corpus of protection for in-
dividuals accused of crime. That degree of protection is largely attributable to the
flexibility of the due process technique."
125. For example: Whose intent is the intent of the document? Those opposed or
those in favor? Those engaged in the debate actively, or those who passively cast their
vote? As between Congress and the ratifying states, whose intent is determinative? As
among the ratifying states, whose intent is determinative? How significant is the public
understanding?
126. The most dramatic demonstration in recent time of the futility of a search for
historical intent of the Fourteenth Amendment occurred in connection with the School
Segregation Cases, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court set the parties and the United States
Attorney General to work to ascertain the intent of the framers with regard to school
segregation. After prodigious labors of historical research the results were presented to
the Court on reargument. The Court's final response, id. at 489:
"This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources
cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced.
At best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amend-
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further obscure the judicial value-choosing inherent in due process adjudication,
which can proceed with greater expectation of success if pursued openly and
deliberatively rather than under disguise.
Desirability of a Fixed Due Process
The need for a flexible due process, whose contours are not permanently shaped
by any fixed mold, but which can adapt to drastically changed and changing
social contexts, is suggested by a proper regard for the function of such a
clause in the written constitution of a democratic community committed to the
doctrine of judicial review. Underlying constitutional restraints is the premise
that the power of government is potentially destructive of the conditions of
freedom, however indispensable government may be for the first conditions
of freedom.1 27 The substantive and procedural limitations of the Constitution,
therefore, are directed toward imposing those limitations upon governmental
power that are required in the interests of preserving a free society. The sub-
stantive limitations insulate certain activities from the power of government
on the premise that governmental regulation thereof must be destructive of
human freedom. Thus the injunction of the First Amendment against laws
"abridging the freedom of speech; or of the press; or of the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances." The procedural limitations proceed from historical insights, that the
manner in which governmental power is exercised upon the individual, even
in an area of legitimate governmental concern, requires limitations. 28 Thus
the prohibitions against bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, the more or
ments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among 'all persons
born or naturalized in the United States.' Their opponents, just as certainly, were
antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them
to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures
had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty."
Research into the intent of the due process clause has yielded answers of no greater con-
clusiveness. Compare the conclusions reached by Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5
(1949), with Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History" and the Constitutional
Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. Cml. L. Ray. 1 (1954).
127. "In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself." TH FEoER.ISr No. 51, at 337 (Modem
Lib. ed.) (Hamilton or Madison).
128. Cf. Jackson, J., dissenting in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206, 218, 224 (1953) :
"Only the untaught layman or the charlatan lawyer can answer that procedures
matter not. Procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence of
liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured if they are fairly and impartially
applied. Indeed, if put to the choice, one might well prefer to live under Soviet
substantive law applied in good faith by our common-law procedures than under
our substantive law enforced by Soviet procedural practices."
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less explicit procedural commands of the Bill of Rights with regard to the
right to counsel, the right of confrontation, the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures and, most
generally, the proscription that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law. Thus conceived, in the light of its
ultimate relation to the preservation of the conditions of a free society, the
residuary procedural guarantee of due process is readily seen to be incom-
patible with changeless meanings. Freezing the meaning of due process, which
in the final analysis is more a moral command than a strictly jural precept,
destroys the chief virtue of its generality: its elasticity. Future generations
would become bound to the perceptions of an earlier one; the experience that
develops with changing modes of governmental power, unpredicted and un-
predictable at an earlier time, as well as the deeper insights into the nature of
man in organized society that are gained in continually changing social con-
texts, would become irrelevant. 129
Accentuated in the period between the drafting of the Constitution and
contemporary times, the flux of science, technology, communication, and social
and economic organization has created new problems of government and
obsolesced others. Thus it has long ceased to be a matter of major concern
whether, as the Fifth Amendment requires, a man accused of a capital offense
be held on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury. The device of the
information is found to accomodate the administration of justice more effi-
ciently without imperiling procedural freedom. The same is true for the require-
ment that the defendant have the right to a jury of twelve in all criminal cases,
as well as in civil cases when the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars.
In the words of Justice Frankfurter: "Some of these [provisions] are enduring
reflections of experience with human nature, while some express the restricted
views of Eighteenth Century England regarding the best methods for the
ascertainment of facts."' 30
On the other hand, the changing character of American society has created
different kinds of impasses between governmental authority and procedural
freedom. 131 These contemporary impasses may be divided into two categories.
The first concerns problems of extension: whether there is warrant for ex-
tending those procedural requirements denoted by the notion of due process
into certain areas other than the formal adjudicatory processes in which they
have traditionally been considered applicable. The second concerns problems
of intension: whether within the areas in which due process has traditionally
129. Cf. Holmes, J., in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920): "The case
before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that
of what was said a hundred years ago."
130. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1947) (concurring opinion).
131. Due process "expresses a demand for civilized standards of law. It is thus not
a stagnant formulation of what has been achieved in the past but a standard for judgment
in the progressive evolution of the institutions of free society." Frankfurter, J., in Malin-
ski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945).
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been applicable, the concept ought properly to be defined to embrace procedural
requirements other than those traditionally embraced by the term.
In the domain of extension, one significant group of problems is created by
those attenuated procedures that have been developed pursuant to the demands
of a security program for insulating disloyal or subversive persons from cer-
tain areas of American life. The federal loyalty program is an obvious ex-
ample. Can it be said that due process is violated by procedures-used to
deprive a person of a right to work for the government-that fall far short
of the requirements of due process in judicial proceedings? The question arises
whether due process is properly extendible to those disloyalty proceedings that
result in an "adverse finding against the employee on the issue of his loyalty
arrived at by a proceeding which has the appearance of a trial on the merits,"'1 32
but in which the finding is made "as a result of secret information given by in-
formants who were not under oath, who were not presented at the hearing and
whose identities were not disclosed to the employee."' 133 A like problem of
extension is raised by the activities of some congressional investigative com-
mittees in so far as they have been employed as a legislative means of imposing
genuine sanctions on individuals through procedures wholly unacceptable in
any judicial proceedings directed to that objective. 134 Another is raised by the
administrative action of the Attorney General of the United States in excluding
aliens without a hearing and declining to disclose the evidence on which he
bases his finding that their entry would be prejudicial to the interests of the
United States.1 35 And it is raised again by the administrative action of the
State Department in denying passports to citizens either without any hearing,
or after a hearing marked by the use of confidential information whose nature
and source is kept from the applicant.136
Other contemporary problems of the extension of due process arise from the
attenuated procedures developed to fulfill more effectively the humanitarian
aims of certain social legislation. One such problem concerns the trial and
treatment of juveniles who have allegedly engaged in criminal conduct. Can
the traditional rights of a youthful accused be modified on the ground that they
interfere with the attainment of the rehabilitative objectives of the juvenile
132. Brief for Petitioner, p. 15, Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
133. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 2, Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955). See
Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), affirming per curiam, by an equally divided
court, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 149, 174, 183 (1951.) (concurring opinions). Concerning state employees,
see Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
134. See Cam, THE HousE CoMui="n ON UN-AmE cAN AcrVTiES 452-63 (1953);
Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 1159 (1956).
135. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) ; United States
ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) ; The Supremle Court, 1952 Term,
67 HAv. L. REv. 91, 99-102 (1953) ; cf. Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
136. See Shactman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Nathan v. Dulles, 129
F. Supp. 951 (D.D.C.), dismissed as vtoot, 225 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Boudin
v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1955).
[Vol. 66: 319
DUE PROCESS ADJUDICATION
delinquency laws ?137 A similar issue is posed by certain proposed and enacted
legislation for the commitment and care of the mentally ill. In so far as these
laws deprive the patient of notice and an opportunity to be heard in non-
emergency situations prior to his commitment to a mental institution, has he
been deprived of due process of law ?138
As for the domain of intension of due process, the major current controversy
turns upon the extent to which police activities employed to obtain testimonially
trustworthy evidence should be held to invalidate a trial and conviction in
which the evidence has been used. Such activities include the obtaining of veri-
fiable confessions 130 or real evidence 140 through the use of physical or psycho-
logical coercion, or the obtaining of evidence through unreasonable searches
and seizures 141 or through the surreptitious use of modern electronic devices,
such as the wire-tap, the detectograph or the concealed microphone.
1 42
The resolution of these contemporary impasses is hardly suggested by any
previously derived signification of the meaning of due process. Solutions of
the problems of another day are useful but certainly not determinative of
today's problems. The ultimate nature of the impasse of all procedural due
process issues may be the same: preserving the integrity of a democratic
community without imperiling other legitimate values. But acceptable reso-
lutions of due process predicaments are not likely to be forthcoming from the
application of pre-formed molds, which by definition ignore the unique char-
acter in which each generation's problems are presented. The dynamic quality
of government permits no such ready answer. Contemporary technological
advancements in the means of "invisible intrusion" pose the problem of privacy
and human dignity in a new guise. New insights and discoveries in psychology
and sociology suggest new dimensions to the problems of social rehabilitative
programs for deviant individuals. In a period of acute international tension
and widespread suspicion, what otherwise might constitute an innocuous dis-
137. Cf. Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 114 A.2d 896 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App.
1955) ; People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932) ; In1 re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599,
100 A.2d 523 (1954); Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944). See also
Rubin, Protecting the Child in the Juvenile Court, 43 J. CRM. L., C. & P.S. 425 (1952).
138. See A Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, Federal Security
Agency, Pub. Health Serv. Pub. No. 51 (rev. 1952) ; State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax,
364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1954) ; Comment, Analysis of Legal and Medical Considera-
tions in Cosonmitment of the Mentally Ill, 56 YALE L.J. 1178 (1947); ABA Special Com-
mittee on the Rights of the Mentally Ill, 72 REP. OF THE ABA 289 (1947). The deter-
mination and treatment of alcoholics raises related problems. See Note, Legislatioi. for
the Trcatnent of Alcoholics, 2 STANr. L. REv. 515, 529-30 (1950).
139. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948);
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) ;
Paulsen, The Fourth Ainendnent and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REv. 411 (1954).
140. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
141. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
142. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952) ; Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) ; Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928).
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charge from employment or a mere denial of a privilege may become trans-
muted into a penalty of the highest order. Fixed resolutions of another day
may provide easy answers; but it is not likely that they will result in answers
that afford continued meaning and vitality to the ultimate function of pro-
cedural limitations upon governmental power in a democratic community.
CRITERIA FOR INTERPRETING A FLEXIBLE DUE PROcEss-AN EVALUATION
Having concluded that quests for fixed meanings of procedural due process
have failed to accomplish more than to mask and drive from conscious recog-
nition the subtle problems of value choosing inherent in due process adjudi-
cation, and that, in any event, no fixed meaning is adequate to the purposes of
the due process clause in a written constitution, one moves to the most per-
plexing aspect of due process adjudication: how are flexible meanings to be
derived in particular situations? One possible approach has been from the
start rejected by the Court: that which would find answers in the unexamined
hunches and predilections of a majority of the Justices. Whether or not in
point of fact this has been the determinative criterion in due process cases,
as may be argued, it is clear that typically the Court has attempted manfully
to avoid it. Recognizing, however, that moral choice is the irreducible ingredient
of due process adjudication, the Court has attempted to break the impasse by
regarding its function as one of passively applying moral judgments already
made, rather than as one of actively making new moral decisions. 1' 3
It is, of course, possible to raise questions concerning the reliability of the
techniques used by the Court to ascertain the prevalent moral judgments of
the community and to decide which segments of society are important to con-
sult. Is it contemporary or historical moral judgments that are ultimately
dispositive? If contemporary moral judgments are important, is it proper to
discount those produced by passing crises on the grounds that they are likely
to change? If so, on what basis does the Court decide which judgments are
stable and which are transitory? Is it fair to assume that the statutes and
court decisions typically used as evidence of moral decisions are fairly repre-
sentative of the conscience of the community? Surely, the decisions of a
group of legislators and judges are not an accurate measure of the judgment of
society; first, they are a selected group, and second, there may well be a time
lag between the decision of the people and its implementation in law. Or does
the "conscience of the community" really mean the conscience of a select group
of the community, its lawgivers-judges and legislators? If so, what theo-
retical justification exists for giving such significance to this one segment of
society? Would a Gallup poll of the moral judgment of the relevant com-
munity be regarded as an absurdity by the Court or as a useful aid to consti-
tutional adjudication?'4
143. See text at pp. 327-28 supra.
144. A model for a scientific investigation into the actual moral feelings of the com-
munity on given issues through the use of refined personal interview techniques has re-
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These and other questions that readily come to mind suggest that the Court
has yet to analyze the full implications of its most conspicuous technique in due
process adjudication. 145 However, since the central objective of this Article
is to examine the possibilities of reason and pragmatic inquiry in due process
decision making, it is necessary to posit the more fundamental question: can
a technique of constitutional due process adjudication that resorts to the pre-
formed moral judgments of others be defended?
The crucial difficulty with this approach is that it escapes rather than meets
the problem. Due process of law in its procedural signification is drained of
any independent integrity as a governing normative principle. It becomes
merely a vehicle for delaying the implementation of a change in procedural law
until it is accepted by the conscience of a sufficient number of the relevant
segments of the community. Theoretically anything is potentially due process.
Its character is irrelevant; all that counts in the end is whether it is accepted.
If and when, therefore, lynching of child sex murderers ceases to offend the
conscience of enough of the community, the state's sponsoring of such activity
would presumably be consistent with due process of law. In a way this con-
signment of the venerable conception of due process to the limbo of complete
moral relativity is an extraordinary development, for it comes down to little
more than this : that due process has no independent meaning. Not only does due
process lose its character as a legal principle; it no longer is even a moral
principle. Or, if it is a moral principle, it is the principle that morality is co-
extensive with the temper of the feelings of any given community at any given
time.
The premise underlying this view of due process adjudication is the complete
subjectivity of all moral judgments. If it is true that a flexible due process
requires the exercise of moral choice, and if it is also true that moral choosing
entails exclusively an appeal to matters of taste and preference into which
reason and objective verification can gain no foothold, how could the Court
justify using due process to foist its own preferences upon the rest of the
country? Since decisions must be made and since decision requires implement-
ing someone's rationally unsupported preference, in a democratic society there
would appear to be one answer-apply the moral choices of the consensus of
the community. In the following pages, however, I propose to make some pre-
liminary inquiries into whether this basic premise, without qualification, is
inescapable; whether, to some degree there may be a standard of correctness
in the moral choosing inherent in due process adjudication; whether the un-
disciplined factors of taste and undemonstrable preference necessarily exclude
any resort to reason and scientific nethod.
Before proceeding to this task, however, it is of crucial importance to recog-
nize that in a venture of this kind there are really two analytically separate
cently appeared. See Cohen, Robson & Bates, Ascertaining the Moral Sense of the Coin-
viunity, 8 J. LEGAL ED. 137 (1955).
145. Id. at 138-39.
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problems. One has to do with the ultimate utility of rationality in moral
choices of the kind under discussion. The second has to do with the extent
to which the theoretically desirable rational inquiry can be an effective element
with regard to the nature and limitations of the judicial process.
Possibilities of the Method of Rationality
The Values Involved in Procedural Due Process
The general function of the procedural restraints upon governmental power
as reflected in due process of law has already been suggested.140 Before in-
quiring into the uses of reason and knowledge in due process decisions it is
desirable to probe somewhat more deeply toward the end of ascertaining in
what particular respects procedural due process relates to the ultimate goals
of a free society. In a sense this is an attempt to specify the values identifiable
in the concept of procedural due process.
Insuring the Reliability of the Guilt-Determining Process. The various pro-
cedural safeguards traditionally demanded in the name of due process appear
to be directed to two objectives. One is the goal of insuring the reliability
of the guilt-determining process-reducing to a minimum the possibility that
any innocent individual will be punished. It is not of crucial importance whether
the individual tried is in fact guilty or innocent, but it is of crucial concern
that the integrity of the process of ascertaining guilt or innocence never be
impaired. If in this effort to insure that none but those guilty be convicted,
many guilty go free, the price is not too great in the long view of democratic
government. If there is any consideration basic to all civilized procedures it is
this, no matter how disparate the means chosen to give it effect.
This consideration, often expressed in terms of "fairness," gives meaning to
the great bulk of procedures that have become part of the due process of law:
that the accused be put on fair notice of the nature of the prohibited acts; that
he be given an adequate opportunity to present his side through counsel before
a fair and impartial tribunal free from prejudicial influences; that he be entitled
to be continuously present at the trial, and to confront and cross-examine his
accusers; that he have the right to be free of the damaging and untrustworthy
influence of coerced confessions and testimony knowingly perjured.
The relation between restrictions on process directed to this objective and
the ultimate values of human freedom is not obscure. With such guarantees,
the area of forbidden conduct is confined within a fixed orbit. A man may
govern his conduct with some reasonable assurance of its legal consequences.
In the area of permitted conduct he may respond to his own judgment free
at least from the fear of society's official sanctions. Due process thus serves
the same end as a positive law, as contrasted with a law residing in the will of
a ruling power-the attainment of legal security and certainty.'
47
146. See text at pp. 340-41 supra.
147. See DicEY, LAw OF THE CONSTITUTION C. III (9th ed. 1939).
[Vol. 66: 319
DUE PROCESS ADJUDICATION
Insuring Respect for the Dignity of the Individual. The second objective
identifiable in other procedural safeguards traditionally deemed a part of the
due process of law is more elusive and subtle. But its vitality is manifest in a
number of requirements not fully explicable in terms of the first objective. An
involuntary confession elicited by brutal physical or psychological pressure
upon the defendant is inadmissible under the due process clause regardless
of the degree to which other evidence corroborates its trustworthiness ;148
relevant and damaging physical evidence has been held inadmissible on the
same ground when it has been obtained by forcibly seizing the defendant
and pumping it out of his stomach. 149 Likewise in this category are the specific
injunctions of the Bill of Rights-the right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures; the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, °5 0
excessive bail and double jeopardy. While the Supreme Court has so far
held only some of these procedural provisions embraced within due process,
they all suggest the presence of a value other than the reliability of the guilt
affixing process. Central to these requirements is the notion of man's dignity,
which is denigrated equally by procedures that fail to respect his intrinsic
privacy or that entail the imposition of shocking brutality upon him. The ideal of
man's individuality, which, after all, is what infuses meaning into the concept
of freedom, is an emotional and personal as well as an intellectual affair. The
temper of society is the soil in which it must find nourishment. Where society's
sanctioned procedures exhibit a disdain for the value of the human personality,
that ideal is not likely to flourish.
The Clash of Opposing Values. If these values were the only operative ones
in formulating the limits of governmental procedures the problem would be of
small compass. The grounds of decision would embrace a straightforward
scientific examination of the causal antecedents of such values. But, in fact,
the pressure of other values competing for recognition poses the crucial prob-
lem. Action consistent with one group of values may prove to be inconsistent
with others. Thus, making a full judicial hearing a condition of severing
governmental employment on grounds of disloyalty tends to maximize the
reliability of the sanctions imposed. But what of protecting the government
against those willing to do it damage if given the opportunity government em-
ployment may offer? And what of the asserted need to those entrusted with
security regulation to preserve the identity and hence the future usefulness of
their informers? Similar conflicts are evident in legislation that aims to re-
habilitate members of society, such as juvenile offenders or the mentally ill. In
148. See note 1 supra; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952).
149. Ibid.
150. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (dictum):
"The traditional humanity of modern Anglo-American law forbids the infliction
of unnecessary pain in the execution of the death sentence. Prohibition against the
wanton infliction of pain has come into our law from the Bill of Rights of 1688. The
identical words appear in our Eighth Amendment. The Fourteenth would prohibit
by its due process clause execution by a state in a cruel manner."
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so far as the process of treatment entails restriction upon liberty of action
and the imposition of undesired consequences, the full judicial hearing tends
to maximize the assurance that only those eligible for such consequences will
be subjected to them. But what of the rehabilitative ends of such laws, which
may be undermined in various ways by the requirement of such procedures?
This clash of values has led some to abandon the hope that reason and
knowledge can find any leverage in matters of value choosing typified by due
process adjudications. Judge Learned Hand, for example, suggests that "the
answers to the questions which they [constitutional restraints] raise demand
the appraisal and balancing of human values which there are no scales to
weigh." Sometimes we can tell the factual effects of a proposal, just as one
can tell how much money a tax will raise and who will pay it. But the kernel
of this matter "is the choice between what will be gained and what will be lost.
The difficulty here does not come from ignorance, but from the absence of any
standard, for values are incommensurable."' 15 This is not a new insight. Car-
dozo earlier had observed that "thinkers have complained with justice of the
lack of any formula whereby preference can be determined when values are
conflicting. There is no common denominator to which it is possible to reduce
them. 115 2 In a sense, what follows is an attempt to explore the limitations and
qualifications of this insight in the context of due process decision-making.
The Accommodation of Alternative Values. The impasse is at least partly
a product of the way of stating the question. When the issue is put in terms
of the collision of absolutely stated values, perhaps there is little room for
other than a personally anchored like or dislike. It may be doubted, however,
that this is the best or most accurate way of putting such questions. The in-
sight of the pragmatic philosophers is a useful one; that is, that values are
not once-and-forever-stated absolutes, but are, after the fashion of scientific
laws or principles, tentatively formulated generalizations which explain the
resolution of past moral impasses and which serve to give direction to the
solution of new ones. Stated values, therefore, are distilled formulations of
wants discovered by examining past solutions to problems of choice. It follows
that any new problem where past formulations of wants appear to suggest
contrary lines of action requires an examination of alternative modes of action
in the context of the problem presented to ascertain the wanted or valued
solution. So viewed, what is demanded is not so much the resolution of con-
flicting values as the accommodation of values-rendering our ultimate wants
consistent with our action by ascertaining the common denominator of those
tentative want formulations that have arisen from past solutions to other
problems.
The development of Anglo-American procedures associated with due process
in the traditional criminal law area exemplifies this kind of value accommodation.
The important values of maximizing the reliability of the guilt determination
151. HAND, SPIRIT o" LIBERTY 161 (1952).
152. CARDOzo, PARAoxEs OF LEGAL ScIEN E 56-57 (1928).
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process and preserving respect for the individual would appear on the surface
to conflict with the value of enforcing the criminal law by punishing as many
guilty persons as possible. In actuality, however, the procedures evolved to
define criminal law due process can be more usefully and accurately viewed, not
so much as a compromise of the conflicting values, as their accommodation in
the context of enforcing the criminal law. Thus, the accommodation arrived
at suggests that the essence of the apparently conflicting values is neither that
the innocent should never be punished or that no man should suffer his privacy
and dignity to be impaired at the hands of the state, nor that the sanctions of
the criminal law should unfailingly be applied to those who have violated the
law. The essential values as they finally appear are that the guilty be punished
with sufficient consistency to serve the social functions of the criminal law;
that the freedom of the individual responsibly to govern his social behavior
and the respect for individual decency be preserved; and that the opening for
the subversion of the democratic social order through corruption of the criminal
processes be prevented.
Value accommodation so viewed, reason and knowledge gain greater lever-
age. While absolutely viewed ethical principles in diametric collision leave
room perhaps only for personal choice, accommodation of wants to new social
contexts is more readily seen to be more an affair of reason and knowledge-
reason, by way of reflection upon the ultimate distillate of the multiplicity of
wants when their prior formulation appears to offer no handles for decision;
knowledge, by way of an estimate of the alternative lines of conduct available
and of their consequences. 15 3
Two important, but not ultimately damaging, qualifications must be made.
First, it may well be that in a given choice situation reason will have run itself out
without reliably having indicated the grounds for choice-that is, where the
situation is ultimately ambiguous, prior conduct no guide, and the bedrock
of personal choice solidly and unavoidably faced. But to suggest that this
radical impasse characterizes all attempts to give meaning to the broad stand-
ards of the Constitution abandons reason too quickly. Secondly, available
knowledge may also prove inadequate. Only haphazard and desultory excur-
sions have as yet been made into the vast problems of the human and social
sciences. To this, two observations may be made. One, even absent the know-
ledge to deal adequately with such problems, the possibility of their ultimate
resolution will be substantially enhanced if the failure is recognized as one of
an absence of knowledge rather than of the futility of knowledge. Two, the
use of available knowledge can be expected to achieve more reliable solutions,
even though less than certain ones, than are offered by the despair of arationality
or the false promise of the literal word.
153. Cf. HUGnES, THE SUPREME. COURT OF THE UNITEI STATES 165-66 (1928):
"[T]he protection both of rights of the individual and of those of society rests not so often
on formulas, as to which there may be agreement, but on a correct appreciation of social
conditions and a true appraisal of the actual effect of conduct."
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Rational Inquiry and the Significant Questions to be Asked
As suggested above, the various traditional procedural requirements of due
process indicate the influence of two significant values: (1) maximization of
the reliability of the guilt determination process, and (2) preservation of the
intrinsic dignity of the individual. Some specific procedural requirements are
motivated by both considerations; others, perhaps most, appear to reflect pre-
dominantly one or the other. The pertinent lines of pragmatic inquiry, there-
fore, are not necessarily the same for all kinds of procedures identified with due
process. The immediately following analysis will consider only those avenues of
inquiry relevant in discovering the permissibility of attenuating in new contexts
those traditional procedures that serve to insure the reliability of the determi-
nation process.
The Impact of the Decision in Question. One obvious area of knowledge that
requires investigation has to do with the impact of the decision which has at
least two relevant dimensions: the impact upon the personal life of the indi-
vidual as to whom it is made, and the impact upon society of permitting a
possibly greater margin for misdeterminations. For example, the quantum of
proof necessary in most civil matters, usually involving the creation of only
a monetary liability, is less than that required for the imposition of the sanctions
of the criminal law. The difference is perhaps most readily explicable in terms
of the impact of the respective findings. The personal impact upon the life
of the individual from the imposition of criminal sanctions is of far more serious
proportions than from the imposition of a civil liability The impact upon society
is likewise of a different order. The greater consequences for the security of
society portended by the administration of the criminal law permit a lesser
margin for error. The breakdown of a free society is more likely to arise
out of the unpredictable enforcement of criminal penalties than out of a like
unpredictability in determining the incidence of civil liability.
The reaction of the courts to the juvenile delinquency laws dispensing with
many traditional safeguards of the criminal law affords another example. In
making determinations of whether young persons have committed acts that
subject them to the consequences of these laws (acts which, apart from such
laws, would be crimes), such safeguards as the right of public trial, the right
to confrontation and examination of witnesses and the right to representation
by counsel have been eliminated. The predominant reaction of the courts, how-
ever, has been to sustain the constitutionality of these laws against due process
challenges. The typical rationale of these cases is that no finding of criminality
attends individual determinations of juvenile delinquency; the significance of
a finding is that the youth needs care, not that he deserves punishment for an
anti-social act. Further, the objective of these findings is not to impose punish-
ment but purely to rehabilitate youthful citizens into acceptable social indi-
viduals. The fact that the individual himself may object to the determination
and its consequences is not made dispositive.154 The personal and social impacts
154. See note 137 supra.
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of misdeterminations are more readily tolerated when the personal consequences
for the life of the individual and the social consequences for the security of the
general population are significantly less portentous.
A reference to two current and unresolved impasses in the use of govern-
mental procedures short of those traditionally required by due process of law
suggests the import of knowledge of the kind described. In the history of
federal civil service the Supreme Court had virtually no occasion to consider
the applicability of constitutional due process to procedures for terminating
employment until the creation of the federal employee loyalty program. Since
then the Court has had two opportunities; the first was lost through failure
to obtain a majority for a decisive position ;155 the second, because of the availa-
bility of nonconstitutional grounds.156 The circumstance responsible for the
creation of this new issue is the enhanced personal and social impact of a find-
ing of ineligibility. What is at stake is a finding that an individual is of sufficiently
doubtful loyalty that he cannot be trusted to work in the employ of his country.
Especially "in time of cold war and hot emotions when 'each man begins to
eye his neighbor as a possible enemy, ' ,1"57 the impact of such a finding begins
to approximate "the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction,' '5 5s and
the issue of the applicability of the due process procedures of the criminal law
is immediately raised.
With this development in federal security may be compared the impact of a
finding of need for institutionalized mental treatment under procedures that
have dispensed with the requirements of advance notice and hearing. Quite
plainly the personal and social consequences of this type determination is of
a different order from determinations of criminality or disloyalty; the conse-
quences are not deliberately imposed hardships, but scientific medical treat-
ment; the objective is not to penalize or ostracize, but to rehabilitate sick
persons into healthy ones. While social stigma may result, it may be signifi-
cantly less severe than that which follows a conviction of a crime or a finding
of disloyalty. At the threshold of inquiry into the issue of extending traditional
criminal due process procedures into these new kinds of determinations, a
pragmatic examination of the personal and social consquences of findings in
these two respective areas is of immediate relevance.
155. Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951.).
156. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
157. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952). "There can be no dispute about
the consequences visited upon a person excluded from public employment on disloyalty
grounds. In the view of the community, the stain is a deep one; indeed, it has become a
badge of infamy." Id. at 190-91. Cf. Douglas, J., concurring in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 180 (1951) : "A disloyalty trial is the most crucial
event in the life of a public servant. If condemned, he is branded for life as a person un-
worthy of trust or confidence. To make that condemnation without meticulous regard for
the decencies of a fair trial is abhorrent to fundamental justice."
158. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(concurring opinion).
1957]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Justification of the Attenuated Procedure. But while an estimation of the
personal and social impact of a finding is a necessary consideration in the de-
cision of due process extension to areas beyond the criminal law, it is obviously
not sufficient. Whether it be determined that the impact is equivalent to or
less than the consequences of a criminal conviction, a rational decision of
whether the demands of due process allow any attenuation of traditional pro-
cedures must depend upon the case made in justification for the attenuation.
The relation between the two factors would appear to be direct; the greater
the severity of the impact of the determinations, the greater the degree of
urgency and persuasiveness that must be shown. In the area of the federal
employee loyalty program, for example, the Court has indicated its conviction
that the impact of findings of disloyalty is similar to criminal sanctions.1 9 One
might expect, therefore, the requirement of a relatively strong justification for
increasing the hazard of misdeterminations. Where, on the other hand, the
order of the impact is significantly less, as perhaps in the area of mental
commitment or in administering the juvenile delinquency laws, a greater play
for legislative experimentation with procedures is tolerable.
There appear to be chiefly two constituents that determine the strength or
weakness of the justification: the nature of the values it purports to further;
and the indispensability of the attenuated procedures in attaining those objec-
tives. The first evaluates the substantiality of the objectives in terms of the
needs of a functioning democracy. Are they, on the one hand, of the order of
furthering the national security, or restoring the mentally ill, or rehabilitating
youthful delinquents? Or are they, on the other hand, to speak of extremes.
of the order of reducing the cost of administering the law, avoiding delays, or
the like. The second element examines the degree to which the attainment
of those objectives necessitates the attenuation of the procedures designed
to insure reliable determinations.
The two facets of the case for justification are obviously not equally amenable
to assessment in terms of knowledge. The substantiality of the objective is
not susceptible of fine measurement-here indeed there are no scales to make
the balance. However, while precise order in the hierarchy of values is unat-
tainable, the extremes at either end are more easily recognized. In addition,
where the competing values are too close on the scale to trust to ready differ-
entiation, the inquiry may be turned to the other measure-the necessity for the
attenuated procedures. Here empiric inquiry is on surer ground. While there
may be formidable obstacles to reliable measurement, the fault is the absence
of knowledge, not its irrelevance.
Reverting to an example chosen from current impasses in due process signif-
ication-commitment procedures-it is apparent that the body of knowledge
available for judgment, while not complete, is significant. In the area of
hospitalizing the mentally ill, observations of psychiatrists and administrators
are available as to the effect of advance notification and contested hearings on
159. See note 157 supra.
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the medical prognosis of the patient. The substantiality of the evidence that
such procedures impair successful treatment by deterring early steps to hos-
pitalization requires a judicial assessment on the level of pragmatic examination.
Integrally related is an examination of the extent to which substitute pro-
cedures have been provided to palliate the increased peril of misdeterminations.
The recent Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally I11,110 for
example, while dispensing with advance notice and hearing, assures a full
judicial determination at any time after commitment upon demand of the patient
or one acting on his behalf, guarantees habeas corpus, insures the right of the
patient to communicate by sealed mail, and requires periodic inspections by
hospital staff.'01
The Relevance of and Evidence for a Prediction of Consequences
Ultimately the judgment, which will be phrased in terms of whether given
procedures are consistent with due process, entails a prediction of consequences.
What will be the effect upon the character of a free society where the proce-
dures sanctioned may fall short of the level of reliability insured by traditional
due process procedures? Is there a serious and imminent threat that the essen-
tial moral commitments of a society will be substantially impaired, or may a
successful resolution of apparently competing considerations be reasonably pre-
dicted? The factors of individual and social impact of misdeterminations and
the justification for the added risk of such misdeterminations are significant
precisely because of their relevance in making such a prediction. In effect they
point respectively to the questions, what will be the effect of an added risk of
misdeterminations if certain procedures are sanctioned, and what will be the
effect of not permitting an attenuation of those procedures. Perhaps in some
cases the peril readily foreseeable from the use of such provisions in a given
context is so obviously great as compared with the harm of not sanctioning
those procedures, or vice versa, that the answer is immediately indicated. In
other, perhaps most, cases the relevant consequences of action and inaction will
not be so apparent. In any event, the crucial issue turns principally on pre-
diction of consequences; and predicting consequences is the particular business
of knowledge. I say principally because no matter how much knowledge is at
hand, the question of what is a "substantial impairment" of the essential com-
mitments of a free society may well entail a subjective judgment. But the effort
to rationalize the process of adjudication of due process questions has not there-
fore led to a dead end. First, even if in the last analysis a nonscientific judg-
ment must be made, the ambit of this judgment has been confined as narrowly
as possible through the identification of the relevant factors of decision and a
maximum exploitation of the uses of knowledge. Secondly, even in the final
160. See note 138 supra.
161. On this subject generally, see Kadish, A Case Study in the Signification of
Procedural Due Process-Institutionalcing the Mentally Ill, 9 WESTERN POL. ScI. Q. 93
(1956).
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matter of rendering a balance, some avenues of pragmatic inquiry may be
available which, if not dispositive, may at least give significant direction.
At this point the experiences of other communities become relevant. While
the Supreme Court has, as indicated, made use of this material, it has done so
purely in the search for preformed judgments. What is being suggested here
is that the chief relevance of this data is its use as a basis for predicting the
factual consequences of the suggested attenuation of procedures and as evidence
of whether those consequences are compatible with the commitments of a free
society. Certainly there are formidable difficulties in this use of such material.
Yet this method is no less than that used traditionally by the social scientist:
lacking the possibilities of controlled experimentation in the laboratory, he re-
sorts to the only empiric ground of study available-the actual conduct of men
in society.
The fundamental problem in making use of the data of comparative legal
systems is the identification and isolation of causal elements out of a complex
pattern of continuously interacting and multifarious cause and effect relation-
ships characteristic of social organizations. Examination of the uses and limita-
tions of such material may best proceed by consideration of the four kinds of
situations in which such experience may be used: (1) where radically dis-
similar and unacceptable communities are examined, and (a) a similar pro-
cedural innovation has not been employed, or (b) a similar procedural inno-
vation has been employed; and (2) where similarly structured and acceptable
communities are examined, and (a) a similar procedural innovation has not
been employed, or (b) a similar procedural innovation has been employed.
Although there are distinguishing considerations in these various situations,
several are common to all. One common factor is the task of identifying what
constitutes a "similar" practice. In Snyder v. Massachusetts,16 2 for example,
the dissent justified its position that the accused had a constitutional right to
be present at the jury view in the well-established principle that the accused
was entitled to be present throughout the trial. Justice Cardozo, on the other
hand, did not consider that principle to cover the jury view, on the ground that
the view did not constitute part of the trial. Interpreted within the meaning of
this principle, "trial" was meant to include only those parts of the proceedings
absence from which might be actually prejudicial to the ability of the accused
to defend himself.
Another common problem arises out of the number of relevant comparisons
that need to be made. It has been observed that a danger in the use of com-
parative law lies in the selective character of the systems chosen for compari-
son.163 Although error resulting from selectivity may well prejudice the relia-
bility of the inquiry, all possibly relevant experiences need not be studied in
every case. If it can be satisfactorily determined, for example, that a given
162. 291U.S.97 (1934).
163. See McWhinney, The Supreme Court atd the Dilemma of Judicial Policy-Mak-
ing, 39 MixN. L. REv. 837, 849 (1955).
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procedural innovation was causally related to the unacceptable aspects of a sys-
tem, or, in the case of an acceptable system which had adopted the innovation,
that in all relevant respects the system was so like our own that the procedural
innovation would not have different consequences in our system, a single ex-
perience would suffice. The need for comparison with more than one system
grows out of the difficulty in each case of isolating causal elements.
Turning to the relevant considerations in the use of comparative data of
this sort in the several separate situations indicated above, those entailing a
negative use of this information, 1 (a) and 2(a), can be taken together. Cer-
tainly the fact that wholly unacceptable communities have not made use of a
given procedural mechanism offers little ground for a valid inference that they
are therefore acceptable in our system. The fact that trial by ordeal is not used
in Communist dictatorships or was not used in Nazi Germany scarcely suggests
that trial by ordeal should be acceptable to us. On the other hand, evidence
that acceptable and similarly oriented communities have not employed a par-
ticular procedural innovation may have value but only within a limited area.
Since studies of other systems are useful in predicting the consequences in our
own society and in deciding whether those consequences are compatible with
the commitments of a free society, the absence of that procedure in the ex-
perience of an acceptable society impairs the usefulness of a comparison. None-
theless, data of this sort is relevant in at least one respect: it bears upon the
necessity of the procedural experiment to attain the objectives advanced in its
justification. If similar communities have been able to attain similar objectives
without the attenuation of procedures designed to maximize reliable determina-
tions, it is at least some evidence that we can duplicate that experience. If it
can be shown, for example, that other democratic communities similarly men-
aced by the threat of internal subversion from governmental employees have
successfully met this threat without the attenuation of traditional procedural
safeguards, some doubt is cast, although of course not conclusively, upon the
necessity for the procedures of the federal employee loyalty program.1 4
A problem common to all situations in which the experience of similar and
acceptable communities is used (2(a) and 2(b)) is the selection of societies
sufficiently similar to make comparisons meaningful. The experiences of the
states themselves would appear in this respect to afford the most reliable con-
clusions. Foreign experience presents greater difficulties. Whenever the Court
has used foreign comparative law data in searching for moral judgments, it has
predominately investigated the experience of the United Kingdom and Com-
monwealth countries.'0 5 Others have suggested, however, that the less homo-
geneous cultures of some European countries, with cultural diversities similar
to our own, might prove more reliable.16 Certainly the relevance of another
164. Cf. Bontecou, The English Policy as to Communists and Fascists in the Civil
Service, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 564 (1951).
165. See text at notes 91-95 supra. But cf. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530
(1884).
166. McWhinney, supra note 163, at 849-50.
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nation's experiences cannot be determined apart from the particular question
under examination. In general, however, since the issue turns upon acceptable
procedural frameworks, nations inheriting the same fundamental concepts of
procedural justice as we-generally the English speaking countries-suggest
the most appropriate comparisons.
The positive use of comparative law data in drawing implications from the
employment of a given procedural mechanism in an unacceptable legal system
(1 (b)) warrants consideration. Some due process opinions have attempted to
employ data of this kind, as for example, by identifying secret trials with periods
of oppression in English history ;167 or by identifying the use of extorted con-
fessions obtained in camera with Soviet or Nazi practices. 1 8 But the use of a
procedural innovation in an undemocratic community does not by itself condemn
its use here. As a rhetorical device the comparison has obvious appeal. The
actual evidential value of such identifications, however, would depend upon a
successful demonstration that these procedures were causally related to the
breakdown of freedom, and the sanction of similar procedures here would pro-
duce similar results in American society. The practical difficulties of such a
demonstration would appear enormous.
Perhaps the most fertile area of inquiry is the experience of communities
with value structures and institutions similar to our own that have experimented
with a given procedural innovation (situation 2 (b)). Certainly in such com-
parisons the problem of isolating causal elements, while still formidable, is less
complex than in the other kinds of comparisons discussed. An appraisal in these
terms, for example, of the procedural innovation of the Draft Act Governing
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill might prove of considerable value.' 0 9 Con-
fronted with very largely the same social problem, the United Kingdom and the
Commonwealth countries have long employed procedures for determining
eligibility for commitment which fall short of the rigid requirements of criminal
procedures, but which are supplemented by provisions designed to insure that
persons not eligible for hospitalization will not be held.170 Assessment of these
procedures is facilitated by several official inquiries that scrutinized the operation
of mental commitment laws for evidence of willful or accidental misdetermina-
tions.171 If an examination of this kind indicated that in those countries the in-
cidence of misdeterminations was not appreciably increased and that the objec-
tives of the mental commitment program were furthered by such procedures,
167. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-70 (1948).
168. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944).
169. For a tentative attempt to do so, see Kadish, supra note 161.
170. See, e.g., Lunacy Act, 1890, 53 & 54 VIcr., c. 5, as amended, National Health
Service Act, 1946, 9 & 10 GEo. 6, c. 81, sch. 9; Lunacy Act of 1898, § 9, 6 NEW SOUTH
WALES STAT. 457 (1824-1937) ; Mental Defectives Act of 1911, §§ 4 & 5, 5 PuBUc AcTs
OF NEw ZEALAND 743 (reprint 1932) ; Lunacy Act of 1928, § 26, 4 VICTORIAN STAT. 1
(1929) ; Provincial Hospital Act § 21, 3 REv. STAT. OF NEW BRUNSWICK, c. 179 (1952).
171. REPORT OF THE SELECT COMImTTEE ON LUNACY LAW, 16 H. Comm!. SESSIONAL




some useful knowledge would have been obtained tending to support the con-
stitutionality of similar procedures here. If, on the other hand, the contrary
is indicated, then it would be particularly relevant to know if other democratic
communities have accomplished the objectives of such a program without at-
tenuating traditional due process procedures. Similar evidence might be avail-
able as a result of the experimentation by the various states with different pro-
cedures for commitment of the mentally ill. In view of the relatively close
similarity of social, political and economic conditions among the states, such
evidence would be even more reliable.'7 2
In the foregoing I have argued that the chief value of the study of the experi-
ence of other communities is that it provides some factual data upon the basis
of which relevant predictions can be made of the effect of a mooted procedural
innovation. But such data, of course, has another use, which the Supreme Court
has recognized, of affording guidance on the ultimate issue of judging whether
the consequences predicted are compatible with the commitments of a demo-
cratic community. To the extent that judges and legislators of similar com-
munities have with some consistency sanctioned the use of a given procedure,
something like a presumption, but certainly not a conclusive one, arises that the
final consequences of the use of such procedures are not inconsistent with those
commitments.
Rational Inquiry in Other Areas of Due Process
The preceding analysis has confined itself to an examination of the pragmatic
lines of inquiry relevant to one kind of due process question. However, the
function of insuring reliable determinations does not exhaust the significance
of procedural due process. Due process has at least one other significant di-
mension, manifest most clearly in those restrictions upon the modes of bringing
the law's command to bear upon individuals-double jeopardy, cruel and un-
usual punishment, unreasonable searches and seizures, etc.-which are not
directed to insuring reliable determinations. These restrictions express a
second value-goal implicit in the conception of due process-the preservation
of the intrinsic dignity and worth of the individual. Furthermore, the live con-
stitutional issues in this area have centered not upon the kinds of adjudications
in which those restrictions should operate, but rather upon the essential mean-
ing of these restrictions in adjudications concededly governed by due process
limitations. As put above, the problems relate to the intension rather than the
extension of procedural due process.
No attempt will be made here to elaborate upon the relevant avenues of in-
172. Absent sufficient evidence upon which a confident judgment of constitutionality
can be made, much can be said for a provisional judgment upholding the use of the mooted
procedure pending the development of a reliable body of experience in the state involved
as well as elsewhere. Cf. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (1955),
overruling prior decisions upholding admissibility of evidence procured in violation of
constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure "because other remedies
have completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions. .. "
1957l
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
quiry for this other area of due process. Ultimately, perhaps, the uses of reason
will be directed similarly in all due process questions-assessment of the conse-
quential impact of withdrawing or imposing certain procedural limitations in
terms of the most successful adjustment of apparently conflicting value-goals.
But the relevant considerations and available techniques for their determination
may differ. For example, when the practice is directed to preserving the dignity
of the individual, the factors necessary for a prediction may not be as readily
measurable as when the value concerns the reliability of determinations. Further,
while in the latter case the moral judgments of significant segments of the com-
munity is not, I have argued, dispositive, the problem is different when the
human dignity function is preeminent. Then the value itself, human dignity, is
a product of and has meaning in terms of societal attitudes.
Limitations on the Use of Rationality in the Process of Judicial Reviczv
In the first part of this section the attempt was made to examine the extent
to which the methods of rationality could be effectively utilized in the task of
giving meaning to a flexible due process. In a sense, the issue there discussed
was a false one,1 73 since the analysis proceeded in disregard of the realities of
judicial review in operation. The discussion was premised upon the existence of
a decision-making institution unrestricted in its access to and use of relevant
data. The central question was: how could an ideal decision-maker confronted
with the problem of signifying meanings for a flexible due process maximize
the uses of reason and intelligence? But the Supreme Court exercising the
function of judicial review is plainly not that ideal decision-making institution.
It remains for the final pages of this Article to explore the implications of this
conclusion.
The extensive examinations of fact and policy crucial to rational inquiry
might be said to convert the Court into an active participator in policy making,
counter to the dominant tendency of confining the role of the Court in the
exercise of judicial review within as narrow a compass as possible. Several of
the common objections to an enlarged judicial review lose much of their per-
suasiveness, however, where the challenge is not to remake substantive policy,
but to supervise the procedures through which laws are enforced upon indivi-
duals.'7 4 The objection that judges lack the expertise and background to make
competent judgments of policy falls short of the mark when the policy concerns
procedural matters. The main business of courts, after all, has historically
been the process of adjudication-applying rules of law to the concrete setting
of a case. It is unlikely that any other organ of government will have greater
insight into procedural problems.
173. Though perhaps no more so than the speculations of the physicist on the move-
ment of a free-falling object in a vacuum.
174. See Kauper, The First Ten Amendments, 37 A.B.A.J. 717, 783 (1951) ; Mendel-
son, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Process of Judicial Review, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 295,




As for the alleged nondemocratic character of judicial review, permitting as
it does a handful of appointed judges to interfere with the policy determinations
of representatively elected officials, again the objection is not so great in mat-
ters of procedure. While in some cases the veto of a chosen procedure may al-
together scuttle a legislative scheme, in many instances there is still room left
the legislature to effectuate its substantive objectives through alternate pro-
cedures. Furthermore, "insofar as it [procedural due process] is technical
law, it must be a specialized responsibility within the competence of the judiciary
on which they do not bend before political branches of the Government, as they
should on matters of policy which comprise substantive law.' 1 75
Another objection to judicial review-that it imperils the prestige and inde-
pendence of the judiciary by embroiling it in charged partisan political con-
troversies- 176 likewise applies with less force. To some degree public opinion
may fail to distinguish between substantive political determination and the pro-
cedures designed for its implementation. Yet, to the extent that the distinction
can be maintained, the danger of political embroilment is lessened.
But the special competence of the Court in constitutional questions involving
the adjudicatory process does not wholly bridge the gap between rational solu-
tion of due process questions and the Court's institutional limitations. The
remaining practical problem is whether the Supreme Court is institutionally
equipped to ascertain and evaluate the complex factual data necessary for
rational decision-making. It is beyond the scope of this Article to undertake a
full scale inquiry into the problem of the use of knowledge outside the record in
constitutional adjudication. But because my purpose has been to suggest the
theoretical possibilities of resolving procedural due process issues through the
methods of reason and empiricism, some general observations on the practical
or instrumental aspect of the subject are inescapable.
In the first place, the use of "legislative" facts, as distinguished from "adjudi-
cative" facts peculiar to the litigants,1 77 is not a new experience for the judicial
system. The day is long past, if it ever truly existed, when the judicial function
was regarded as narrowly confined to applying pure rules of law to judicially
proven facts.17 8 Certainly the Supreme Court has recognized the relevance of
social and economic data in the process of adjudication and has been willing to
make use of them; most notably in cases calling for determinations of con-
stitional questions, in which "constitutional facts" have been of crucial impor-
tance. 70 In turning questions of constitutionality upon such matters as the
175. Jackson, J., dissenting in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206, 218,224 (1953).
176. See HAND, SPIRIT OF LIBERTY (1952).
177. See Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 HARv. L. REv. 364, 402 (1942).
178. See Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. Rzv. 945, 952-60 (1955) ; Bikl6, .udi-
cial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legis-
lative Action, 38 HAv. L. R:v. 6 (1924) ; Note, Social and Economic Facts-Appraisal
of Suggested Techniques for Presenting Them to Courts, 61 H~Av. L. Rav. 692 (1948).
179. See Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 CoLUm. L. Rav. 945 (1.955); Bikld, supra note
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relation of hours of work to female health,8 0 the nature of abuses in the employ-
ment agency business and the possible effects of maximum fee charges,' 1 ' or
the character and consequences of certain kinds of merchandising, 182 the Court
has recognized the empirical breadth of constitutional adjudication. And in
resolving such questions it has turned to the products of the research of the
social scientist-treatises, technical articles, private research reports, congress-
ional committee reports.'18 While resort has been made to data of this kind
principally in economic due process questions, similar inquiries are manifest in
other kinds of constitutional issues. In such cases as Dennis v. United States 184
and American Communication Ass'n, CIO v. Douds 185 the various opinions
of the Justices range far and wide into questions of international relations, the
historical development of Communist influences in foreign countries, the nature,
aims and practices of Communism, and the contemporary state of the American
mind. Most recently, in the Segregation Cases, the Court paid its respects
to the research of the social psychologists in reaching its conclusion that public
school segregation per se has deleterious consequences on the personality and
learning potential of Negro children.'8 6 To some degree data of this kind has
reached the Court through lower court direct testimony ;187 but the principal
access to it has been through the device of judicial notice, combined with the
Court's independent researches'8 " or the presentation of factual data by counsel
in the form of the Brandeis brief.'8 9 While the device of judicial notice as a
means of access to constitutional facts has serious limitations, especially if it
is restricted to facts "so universally known that they cannot be the subject of
dispute,"'190 a good case can be made that the Supreme Court in constitutional
cases has successfully molded it to the demands of its function.','
177; Note, The Presentation of Facts Underlying the Constitutionality of Statutes, 49
HARv. L. REV. 631 (1936).
180. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Compare People v. Williams, 189 N.Y.
131, 81 N.E. 778 (1907), with People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 214 N.Y. 395, 108
N.E. 639 (1915).
181. Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928), especially dissenting opinion at 359.
182. Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924), especially dissenting opinion
at 517.
183. See notes 180-82 supra.
184. 341,U.S. 494 (1951).
185. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
186. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
187. Id. at 494. See discussion of expert testimony of social scientists in the Segre-
gation Cases at the trial level in Note, 61 YALE L.J. 730, 735-38 nn.25-35 (1952).
188. See, e.g., Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinions in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S.
312, 354 (1921), and United Ry. and Elec. Co. v. West, 280 U.S. 234, 255 (1930).
189. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
190. UNIFORm RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 9 (1953). Rule 9 further requires that notice-
able facts be "of generalized knowledge which are capable of immediate and accurate
determination by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy." See also
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 801-06 (1942).
191. See Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 CoLum. L. REv. 945 (1955).
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In the light, therefore, of this long experience of the Court with pragmatic
data, the practical implementation of rational inquiry in procedural due process
cases calls for no significant new departure in the methodology of constitutional
adjudication. In a sense it comes to this: that the world of fact and knowledge
is relevant as well to issues involving the signification of a flexible due process
as it is to substantive due process questions. Yet this may not be an altogether
fair or complete answer to the problem raised at the beginning of the section.
First, although the Court has proven itself willing and able to make use of
some pragmatic data, there are serious limitations upon the efficient use of
such data in the adjudicatory process; second, the character of the pragmatic
inquiry suggested for resolving due process questions raises special problems
of its own.
For the first, the adversary system is not well suited for complex scientific
investigations of fact.1 92 The collection, evaluation and presentation of social
science data calls for subtle skill and training not part of the educational back-
ground of the lawyer. He has no special qualifications to deal with historical,
economic, sociological or psychological fact and theory. Further, such projects
are expensive; it is truer here than in a legal argument that the more persuasive,
if not the more valid, case will be made by the side with the biggest research
team of scholars. In addition, the atmosphere of a partisan clash of scientists
is not suitable for gaining genuine insight into human societal problems.19 3
If the Justices themselves were trained scholars in the social sciences, or if they
had at their disposal research teams of men so qualified, these handicaps could
conceivably be overcome. But neither is the case.
As for the special problems entailed by the kinds of inquiry suggested in the
foregoing pages, two may be suggested. By and large the Court's use of prag-
matic data has been confined to judging the reasonability of the legislature's
judgment. This is a lesser task than using such data to make an independent
judgment of the reasonability or unreasonability of the legislative or judicial
judgment in terms of an empirically derived policy accommodation. 1  Second-
ly, in so fax as the Court has made use of social science data it has confined itself
to research studies already made. To some extent such existing data may be
expected to prove useful as well for the kind of due process inquiries projected
above. But in perhaps greater measure the kinds of questions upon which
judgments would have to be made have not been answered. Greater scholarship
of the highest order on the outer frontiers of human knowledge and dealing with
the most intractable of subjects would ultimately be inescapable.
192. Cf. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 90-91 (1949).
193. Compare Professor Cahn's trenchant examination of the scientific evidence ad-
duced through the adversary procedure in several of the Segregation Cases at the trial
level. 1954 Annual Survey of American Law, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 10, 161
(1955).
194. See remarks of Professor Freund quoted in CAHN, SUPREME COURT AND SUPRE E
LAW 49-50 (1954).
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This impasse between what is theoretically desirable and practically possible
makes the future progress of constitutional law in this area reasonably debat-
able. On the one hand it is possible to retreat from analysis and revert to the
effort "to imprison due process within tidy categories."' p If this is not the
path of wisdom and reason, it is at least expedient. It is not likely, however,
that this effort could ever succeed. If past efforts in this direction are any guide,
it is more likely that the ultimately dispositive criteria will enter by the back
door, unexamined and only intermittently recognized for what they are. And
if the back door were successfully barred, the predicament would be no more
auspicious; for due process adjudication would have become a purposeless
ritual rather than a means of insuring the conditions of a free society.19
On the other hand, one may conclude that judicial review is ultimately im-
possible if rationally conceived; that it should be abandoned formally or sub
silentio in favor of other means for insuring limitations upon the procedures
available for imposing governmental power upon individuals. Other democratic
societies have attained this objective without the formality of explicit constitu-
tional restraints and without judicial review. 10 7 Yet whatever the inherent
limitations of insuring procedural freedom through judicial interpretation of
a written constitution, by now the commitment has been too long and too con-
sistent to will it away. What may have been possible, or even preferable, in a
nation's beginnings may cease to be even a conceivable alternative after a cen-
tury and a half of institutionalization. Indeed, whatever may be said for legis-
lative supremacy, there is little reason for optimism that the American legis-
lature, whatever its institutional potential for dealing with reason and fact, will
succeed more than the handicapped Court in harnessing the methods of ration-
ality and disinterested intelligence to resolve the critical impasse between au-
thority and freedom.
In the end, it may be ventured, there is reason for hope that the methods
of reason and knowledge can gain greater leverage in resolving the predica-
ment of due process adjudication, despite the unavoidable conclusion that the
level of human knowledge and the institutional disabilities of the Court pre-
clude full utilization of the methods suggested. There is always the prospect
that these institutional limitations can, in part at least, be overcome; as, for
example, through the development of mechanisms to assist the Court in the
195. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 142, 147 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
196. Cf. Frankfurter, J., concurring in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459,468 (1947).
197. "It is highly significant that not a single constitution framed for the English-
speaking countries since the Fourteenth Amendment has embodied its provisions
and one would indeed be lacking in a sense of humor to suggest that life, liberty or
property is not amply protected in Canada, Australia, South Africa."
Frankfurter, J., quoted in McWhinney, The Supreme Court and the Dilemma of Judicial
Policy-Making, 39 MiNN. L. Ray. 837, 846-47 (1955). Cf. Radin, The Judicial Review of
Statutes in Continental Europe, 41 W. VA. L.Q. 112 (1935) ; Deener, Judicial Review it;
Modern Constitutional Systems, 46 Amr. POL. Sci. REv. 1079 (1952).
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efficient use of reason and knowledge.' s But beyond this long-run prospect,
it may be suggested that progress toward finding the right answers or even
the means of finding the right answers can come only after the right questions
have been posed. Moreover, the Court has already hurdled the chief obstacle
by recognizing the indispensability of broad pragmatic inquires in constitu-
tional adjudication; and it has proven itself ingenious and successful in mold-
ing judicial techniques more effectively to fulfill its needs in this regard. The
accomplishment of efficient exploitation of the methods of reason entails not so
much a break with the past, as progress along paths already staked out.
Finally, it is unreal to measure the test of success of rational decision making
in terms of whether decisions become completely rational and completely in-
formed. A more reasonable standard is whether some progress along such lines
is achievable. Certainly some knowledge of the kind pertinent for rational due
process adjudications is already available in the studies of the social sciences;
and the Court to some degiee has access to and is capable of using it. Even
conceding the substantial institutional limitations alluded to, the Court is in a
position at least to expand its use of the methods of reason and scientific in-
quiry. No one who has seriously confronted the course of constitutional ad-
judication of due process questions can fail to rejoice at even a modest in-
crement in that direction.
198. As early as 1924 recommendations were made for the creation of a research body
which would make determination of constitutional facts. Corwin, Reports of the Nat'l
Conference on the Science of Politics, 18 Ams. Pol.. Sci. REv. 119, 153 (1924). See also
PouND, THE SPIRIT OF THE Commox LAW 214 (1921); Beutel, Some Implicatiols of
Experimental Jurisprudence, 48 H~Av. L. REv. 169, 181 (1934).
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